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The Big Crowd and the Small Enterprise:
Intracorporate Disputes in the Close-ButCrowdfunded Firm
Martin Edwards*
ABSTRACT
Equity crowdfunding is a financial innovation that allows small
businesses and startups to access capital through soliciting investment
over the Internet. The current literature on crowdfunding has focused on
its theoretical background and on the development of crowdfunding
exemptions from the securities laws permitting the practice. There is less
discussion of the impact of crowdfunding on corporate governance. This
article fills that gap by outlining the potential for a panoply of
intracorporate disputes between and among majority shareholders and
“crowd” minority shareholders, placing the discussion within the
longstanding—if uneasy—divide in judicial treatment of disputes in
public corporations and close corporations. From there, the article argues
that courts adjudicating disputes in “close-but-crowdfunded” firms
should adopt the contractual approach exemplified by Delaware law, and
refrain from importing minority shareholder oppression doctrine into the
crowdfunding context. The two primary justifications for providing
special protections for close corporation minority shareholders are much
weaker in the crowdfunding context. First, the mechanics of the
crowdfunding process create both the incentive and opportunity to select
appropriate terms upon which the founders will continue their
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B. Accy, The University of Mississippi. I would like to thank Joan MacLeod Heminway
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article. I would like to thank my parents, attorney Eddy and Professor Celie, for
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relationship and which will be offered to the crowd. Second, and
similarly, that same process undermines the inference that there are
unwritten, yet reasonable, expectations about any shareholder’s role in
the venture. Furthermore, the application of oppression doctrine in the
crowdfunded firm would ultimately harm crowd and non-crowd
shareholders alike, while undermining the potential gains from equity
crowdfunding as a new source of capital accumulation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Crowdfunding is a disruptive financial and technological innovation
that has drawn both excitement and skepticism.1 Together with its
intuitive appeal to businesses in search of new sources of capital, its
emergence as an investment mechanism has attracted the attention of
lawmakers and regulators across the United States. Acting upon authority
granted to it by the 2012 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS
Act),2 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently finalized
the first set of crowdfunding regulations, Regulation Crowdfunding.3
Likewise, many state legislatures have acted to permit intrastate sales of
securities to Internet-based crowds.4 As entrepreneurs avail themselves
of these securities law exemptions and begin experimenting with
crowdfunding as a source of equity financing,5 disputes between and
among founders and the crowd may lead to new varieties of
intracorporate litigation.
The emergence of equity crowdfunding arrives against the backdrop
of an ongoing debate about whether, or to what extent, close corporations
should be treated differently than public corporations.6 The defining
traits of a public corporation are the clear separation between the
identities and roles of the shareholders, officers, and directors, and the

1. “Crowdfunding” refers to a broad range of activities that generally involve
soliciting money for business or social ventures through Internet platforms or networks.
See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Crowdfunding and the Public/Private Divide in U.S.
Securities Regulation, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 477, 477 n.1 (2014). This article will focus on
“securities” or “investment” crowdfunding, as opposed to “rewards-based” or “donation”
crowdfunding. See infra Part II.
2. See generally Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126
Stat. 306 (2012). The JOBS Act refers to Titles II, III, and IV of the Act, each of which
opened a different avenue to crowdfunding. Id. §§ 201, 301–305, 401–402, 126 Stat. at
313–15. In brief, Title II permits “general solicitation” over the Internet to accredited
investors under Regulation D, while Title III permits solicitation to unaccredited
investors. Id. §§ 201(a)(1), 302(a), 126 Stat. at 314–15. Title IV granted the SEC
authority to create a tiered version of the prior Regulation A, named Regulation A+, that
allowed for relatively larger offerings through crowdfunding portals to both accredited
and unaccredited investors. Id. § 401(a), 126 Stat. at 323–24.
3. Regulation Crowdfunding, 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.100–.503 (2017); see also infra
notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
4. At least 34 states and the District of Columbia have state-level crowdfunding
exemptions as of 2016. See N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS’N, INTRASTATE CROWDFUNDING
UPDATE: NOVEMBER 16, 2016 2 (2016), http://nasaa.cdn.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/12/NASAA-Intrastate-Crowdfunding-Update-111616.pdf.
5. See Heminway, supra note 1, at 477 n.1. This article assumes a sufficiently
large number of entities will utilize some form of equity crowdfunding. As discussed
later in this Part, there are several reasons crowdfunding may not be adopted widely.
6. See generally Robert B. Thompson, Allocating the Roles for Contracts and
Judges in the Closely Held Firm, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 369 (2011).
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availability of a liquid market for the shares of the corporation’s stock.7
Minority shareholders in public corporations generally expect only
dividends or appreciation in stock value and have little more than a
passive role in corporate affairs.8 If an individual or group of minority9
shareholders are dissatisfied with corporate policies or performance, they
can—and are expected to—exit the corporation by selling their shares.10
Close corporations are defined by a blending of the roles of
shareholder, officer, and director; the close personal relationships
between the players; and the lack of market for reselling shares.11
Minority shareholders in close corporations typically are not passive;
often expect to be officers and directors; and expect to derive their
financial participation from a salary or other payments for service as
officers and directors.12 Appreciation in value is a remote consideration
given the illiquid resale market, though in most cases, close corporation
minority shareholders expect to participate in profits on similar terms as
the majority.13
Both types of corporations utilize similar formal characteristics: the
seat of power in both is the board of directors, which, in the absence of
charter, bylaws, or agreements holding otherwise, makes all important
decisions by majority vote.14 The close corporation minority shareholder
faces a uniquely precarious position: a falling out between the majority
and minority can result in the majority utilizing these formal powers of
the corporation to diminish the role of the minority shareholder from full
7. See Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability Company:
Learning (or Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 888–
92 (2005).
8. See generally Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely
Held Corporations, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1099, 1102–04 (contrasting the close corporation
shareholder to the public shareholder by noting that investors often receive salaries
instead of dividends and that the minority “has great difficulty selling its stock to realize
capital appreciation”).
9. Professor Moll defines “majority” and “minority” shareholders simply as those
shareholders who do and do not have control over the corporation. See Moll, supra note
7, at 883 n.1. This article will use “majority” and “minority” in the same way.
10. See Ragazzo, supra note 8, at 1103 (suggesting that one option for disaffected
public shareholders is to sell their stock).
11. See Moll, supra note 7, at 888–92. As discussed in Part III, the dividing line
between “public” and “close” corporations is far from clear. See infra Section III.E. For
purposes of this article, “public” corporations will refer to corporations with clear
distinctions between the roles and expectations of shareholders, officers, and directors,
while “close” corporations will refer to corporations with substantial overlap and
interaction between those roles.
12. See Moll, supra note 7, at 890–91.
13. See Moll, supra note 7, at 888, 890 (describing close corporation shareholder
expectations of participation in the business in addition to mere return on investment and
payment of a salary in lieu of dividends as distributions of earnings).
14. Id. at 889–90.
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management and financial participation to mere ownership of a
completely illiquid equity interest.15
Courts and legislatures have grappled for some time with how to
protect close corporation minority shareholders from the hard edge of
such disputes.16 Their uneasy answer to the question includes two
primary solutions: (1) awarding damages or equitable relief for the
breach of a special, close corporation heightened fiduciary duty owed by
the majority to the minority,17 or (2) ordering an involuntary dissolution
of the corporation, a buyout of the oppressed minority shareholder, or
some similar equity-style remedy premised on statutory authority.18 The
standard for imposing a remedy under either theory typically is whether
the court finds a material impairment of the minority shareholder’s
reasonable expectations regarding his or her investment.19 The
justification for these solutions is twofold. First, courts note that personal
relationships among founding players usually result in minority
shareholders relying on trust instead of explicit contractual protections
and forgoing the expense of hiring lawyers to negotiate such protections
during the business’s planning phase.20 Second, in the absence of such
contracting and the sophistication it suggests, courts have been willing to
make inferences about parties’ reasonable expectations based upon the
course of the parties’ dealings with one another.21 These circumstances
are foreign to public corporations because of the clear functional
distinctions between shareholders and those in control—by the time the
corporation is large or public, courts no longer view minority
shareholders as in need of special protections.

15. Id.
16. Id. at 883 (“For decades, the law has struggled with the plight of the close
corporation minority shareholder.”); see also Thompson, supra note 6, at 371 (articulating
the view that the debate involves allocating the role of contracting and judicial resolution
of disputes).
17. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass.
1975) (articulating and applying a heightened fiduciary duty for close corporation
shareholders).
18. See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 553 (N.C. 1983) (interpreting a
North Carolina statutory provision providing for dissolution or other “appropriate”
remedies).
19. See Moll, supra note 7, at 884 nn.5–6, 892 n.33; Thompson, supra note 6, at
386–88.
20. See Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 557–60 (evaluating the argument that close
corporation non-controlling shareholders could bargain for protections prior to entering
the arrangement); see also Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486–87 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515 (“No outsider would knowingly assume the position of the
disadvantaged minority.”).
21. See, e.g., Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 563 (discussing “reasonable expectations”
as discernible from the “course of dealing” of the parties).
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Equity crowdfunding applies a new tension to the already uneasy
division between public and close corporations.22 Equity crowdfunding
likely will be utilized in startups23 and small- to medium-sized business
entities.24 For the most part, startups utilizing crowdfunding will do so
for a specific purpose—perhaps to close a gap in funding early in their
life cycle or to avoid selling substantial equity to other types of
investors.25 Given the nature of the startup life cycle, these corporations
generally expand beyond the typical bounds of the close corporation as
they use early capital to build scale, with a clear expectation that early
investors will reap gains when the corporation is later sold or taken
public.26 The same will not be true of many permanently small
businesses that may also utilize crowdfunding.27 Such entities typically
are not prime candidates for traditional equity investments, even if they
stand to achieve and maintain long-term and stable profitability.28
For that reason, this article focuses on intracorporate lawsuits in
equity-crowdfunded entities that mirror those arising in closer and nonpublic enterprises. Close, non-public enterprises usually have a relatively
smaller number of founding players, many of which serve as officers and
directors in addition to maintaining their ownership interests. By
contrast, most crowd shareholders who invest in such ventures are likely
to be mere shareholders. The result is the “close-but-crowdfunded”
entity: an enterprise expected to remain close between and among the
founding shareholder-officer-directors and illiquid as to every
shareholder, while looking much larger and more public because it has
invited a crowd of additional shareholders from the Internet into the

22. As discussed later, there are now many large and private corporations that also
do not fit neatly into the definition of a public or close corporation. See infra Section
III.E.
23. See generally Seth Oranburg, Bridgefunding: Crowdfunding and the Market for
Entrepreneurial Finance, 25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397 (2015) [hereinafter
Oranburg, Bridgefunding].
24. See Richard Swart, Why Equity Crowdfunding Matters to Small Business,
ENTREPRENEUR (July 21, 2016), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/278744. Larger
corporations desiring access to capital from a large number of investors should be
expected to continue conducting traditional public securities offerings.
25. See Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 419; see also Darian Ibrahim,
Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 561, 580–81 (2015)
(describing misfit between professional investment and the lower cash needs of certain
types of startups).
26. See Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 405.
27. See id. (describing smaller businesses as distinguished from fast-growing
startups).
28. Id.
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corporate fold.29 The tensions created by close-but-crowdfunded entities
raise important questions in light of the ongoing debate about
intracorporate disputes in close corporations. How should this close-butcrowdfunded entity, as a whole, be defined once the crowd invests? Does
it remain a close corporation, or is it now a public corporation? If it is a
public corporation, should the close corporation doctrine merely vanish?
In light of this new tension, courts and legislatures may again find
themselves grappling with how to resolve disputes between founding
shareholder-officer-directors in crowdfunded corporations or lawsuits
brought by crowd shareholders against non-crowd shareholder-officerdirectors on both old and new theories of oppression.30
This article argues that courts should resolve intracorporate disputes
in crowdfunded ventures in a manner closer to those occurring in public
corporations.31 Delaware courts have long rejected oppression doctrine in
favor of a contractual approach.32 Specifically, Delaware courts refuse to
provide special protections to non-controlling close corporation
shareholders, instead taking the position that corporate founders should
bargain over protections and formalize the specific terms of their
relationship to each other and the corporation at the outset, no matter
how small or large their business ultimately becomes.33 While some
majority-minority inequities that arise in traditional close corporations
will undoubtedly manifest themselves in close-but-crowdfunded entities,
these tensions are insufficient to support judicial intervention of the kind
applied in close corporation cases. Courts therefore should be reluctant to
impose heightened fiduciary duties, buyouts, or dissolutions on majority
shareholders in close-but-crowdfunded entities, primarily because the
reasonable expectations analysis is not justified in light of the disparate
expectations that can exist in close-but-crowdfunded corporations.
Equity crowdfunding’s arrival on the scene compels the more heavily
contractual analysis applied in Delaware over the judicial supervision
contemplated in close corporation cases.
This article’s analysis depends upon a few assumptions and caveats
about the widespread adoption and trajectory of equity crowdfunding and
the status of oppression doctrines in numerous states. First, the article
29. Cf. Heminway, supra note 1, at 479–80 (describing the manner in which
crowdfunding blurs the longstanding distinction in securities regulation between public
and private securities).
30. See infra Section IV.C (illustrating potential oppression-like claims that could
arise in close-but-crowdfunded ventures).
31. See infra Sections IV.C–.D.
32. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379 (Del. 1993) (holding that
Delaware law does not provide special remedies for non-statutory closely-held
corporations).
33. Id. at 1379–80.
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assumes equity crowdfunding will be adopted broadly enough to produce
lawsuits. Given the thoroughly discussed shortcomings of Regulation
Crowdfunding, widespread equity crowdfunding activity simply may
never arrive.34 Even so, early reports suggest equity crowdfunding is
taking root in some businesses in some places.35 Other reports suggest
that many small ventures are utilizing state law crowdfunding
exemptions and forgoing nationwide offerings of securities.36 In addition,
much of this article focuses on businesses that will likely remain
relatively small and close, and otherwise would not become large or
public.37 Finally, this article does not provide significant substantive
analysis of Delaware law, which, as noted above, has never recognized a
heightened fiduciary duty, does not have statutory provisions or judicial
recognition for buyouts or dissolutions,38 and has expressed a clear
preference for contracting in non-statutory close corporations.39 Despite
34. See generally C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption:
Promise Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. 195 (2012); Joan MacLeod Heminway, How
Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale of Political Pressure, Hasty
Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments that Begs for a Happy Ending, 102 KY. L.J. 865
(2014).
35. See generally Marc A. Leaf, Robert T. Esposito & Abigail Luhn, Leading the
Crowd: An Analysis of the First 50 Crowdfunding Offerings, DRINKERBIDDLE (July 14,
2016), http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/insights/publications/2016/07/leading-the-crowdfirst-50-crowdfunding-offerings.
36. E.g., Jeannette Lee Falsey, Sitka Brewery Is First to Sell Shares Under New
Alaska Crowdfunding Law, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Apr. 14, 2017),
https://www.adn.com/business-economy/2017/04/14/sitka-brewery-is-first-to-sell-sharesunder-new-alaska-crowdfunding-law/.
37. Some examples include craft breweries, see id., food trucks, and similar
business ventures whose strategy includes an appeal to smallness or localness. See
Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 406 (discussing permanently small businesses
expected to grow sustainably, but not quickly); see also J.W. Verret, Uber-ized
Corporate Law: Toward a 21st Century Corporate Governance for Crowdfunding and
App-Based Investor Communications, 41 J. CORP. L. 927, 930–31 (2016) (observing a
space for crowdfunded small businesses to experiment with new ideas in their
governance).
38. The Delaware General Corporation Law does provide for the appointment of a
custodian with the authority to sell or dissolve a corporation upon the finding of a
deadlock between directors and related circumstances. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226
(2017). Deadlock, however, is not the same as oppression in the vast majority of cases.
See generally F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 7.16 (rev. 2d ed. 2004)
[hereinafter O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION] (describing how various state statutes
define deadlocks that would give rise to judicial remedies).
39. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379–80 (Del. 1993) (discussing
the opportunity for shareholders in close corporations to contract for various protections
ex ante). The Delaware approach to close corporations likely mirrors the one proposed
for close-but-crowdfunded corporations advanced in this article. Nonetheless, Delaware
has recognized the existence of an equitable dissolution remedy for LLC membership
assignees in the context of the deadlocked LLC, which, importantly, derived not from the
statute—which provided for dissolution only upon petition of a member—but from the
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Delaware’s significance in the development of corporation law, early
evidence suggests crowdfunding is occurring in a substantial number of
corporations formed outside of Delaware.40 In these places, and in the
business sectors where equity crowdfunding may be expected to take
root, close-but-crowdfunded corporations are poised to become a
substantial slice of the crowdfunding market. It is in these jurisdictions
that this article’s proposal to follow Delaware’s contract-focused
approach will be most important.
The current scholarly focus on crowdfunding involves the merits
and demerits of Title III of the JOBS Act and its resultant Regulation
Crowdfunding,41 proposals for the continued development of
crowdfunding,42 and the critical work of constructing the phenomenon’s
theoretical architecture—especially in the investment crowdfunding
context.43 Less material exists covering corporate governance issues that
may emerge in crowdfunded ventures.44 This article supplies the first
exploration of equity crowdfunding in the context of the close
corporation.
Part II of this article provides a brief history of crowdfunding,
distinguishes equity crowdfunding from other forms of crowdfunding,
discusses the forms equity investment may take in investment
crowdfunding, briefly evaluates potential limitations to equity
crowdfunding under current law, and discusses the broader social and
economic context from which crowdfunding emerged.45 Part III contains
a review of the divide between judicial treatment of public corporations
and close corporations, and illustrates how crowdfunding applies tension
to this divide.46 Part IV defends the claim that crowdfunding will emerge
in previously close corporations and argues that courts should not
apply—and crowd shareholders should not expect courts to apply—close

constitutional power of the Delaware courts. See In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114 A.3d
592, 601–02 (Del. Ch. 2015). Some crowdfunded equity may be sold as membership
units in LLCs. See Leaf et al., supra note 35 (stating that 6 of the first 50 filings under
this new regulation include a sale of LLC membership interests).
40. See Leaf et al., supra note 35 (showing that 24 of the first 50 offerings under
this new regulation were in Delaware). See generally Anthony Zeoli, Intrastate
Crowdfunding: The Often Overlooked Option, CROWDFUND INSIDER (May 25, 2016,
12:23 PM), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/05/86096-intrastate-crowdfundingthe-often-overlooked-option/.
41. See generally Bradford, supra note 34; Heminway, supra note 34.
42. E.g., Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 419–22 (introducing a proposal
for crowdfunding to provide a “bridge” in the financing life cycle for startups).
43. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1; Heminway, supra note 1, at 477.
44. See generally Verret, supra note 37.
45. See infra Part II.
46. See infra Part III.
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corporation doctrines in close-but-crowdfunded corporations.47 A brief
conclusion follows.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CROWDFUNDING
Crowdfunding lies at the convergence of technological innovations
in networked communication and the age-old concept of raising money
by soliciting small contributions from a large number of people.48 The
Internet revolutionized social networks and obliterated communication
barriers, while payment systems evolved to permit quick and easy digital
transfers of funds. This dramatic change culminated in inexpensive
platforms where people could collect money easily and efficiently.49
Cataloguing the permutations of crowdfunding is beyond the scope of
this article, but this Part provides an illustrative sample.
A. Crowdfunding By Definition
Crowdfunding connects excitement for an idea, product, or service
with previously untapped funds. In addition to the efficiencies in
communication and payment systems discussed above, crowdfunding is
identifiable by the outpouring of funds from communities of common
interest.50 For example, one of the first instances of modern, Internetbased crowdfunding was an informal 1997 fundraising drive by fans of
the English progressive rock band Marillion.51 When the band’s record
47. See infra Part IV.
48. See Bradford, supra note 43, at 11 n.17 (comparing crowdfunding to the
donative model used to fund political campaigns). Another historical example is famed
newspaper publisher Joseph Pulitzer’s fundraising drive to purchase and construct the
pedestal for the Statue of Liberty. See The Statue of Liberty and America’s Crowdfunding
Pioneer, BBC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-21932675.
The statue, a gift from the people of France, faced a funding crisis as funding bills in the
State of New York and Congress failed. Id. Pulitzer stepped in, publishing his plea for
funds in his New York World newspaper with the promise that every donor’s name would
be printed. Id. The campaign raised just over the $100,000 needed to complete the
project. Id.
49. See Bradford, supra note 43, at 10 n.11 (“[A]n entrepreneur can ‘in real time
and with no incremental cost . . . [sell] . . . to literally millions of potential investors.’”)
(quoting Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC’s Continuing
Failure to Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 6
(2007)).
50. See Mathieu-Claude Chaboud, How Do the Crowdfunders Judge the
Crowdfunded? Crowdfunding, Social Capital, and the Gatekeepers of the Financial
Legitimacy, in STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO SUCCESSFUL CROWDFUNDING 78, 79
(Djamchid Assadi ed., 2016) (discussing generally the idea of support for a particular
product from a community of interest).
51. See Dean Golemis, British Band’s U.S. Tour Is Computer-Generated, CHI. TRIB.
(Sept. 23, 1997), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-09-23/features/9709230071_
1_music-fans-newsgroup-marillion.
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label faced financial trouble, Marillion announced to United States-based
fans that it would be unable to make its scheduled summer tour in the
United States.52 Disappointed fans connected with one another through
message boards and email and began raising money to bring Marillion to
the United States.53 The cavalcade of donations quickly reached $25,000,
allowing Marillion to schedule the tour.54 The campaign ultimately raised
$47,000, with money left over to fund the production of 1,000 special
edition live recordings of the tour, which were distributed to donors.55
Marillion’s story illustrates the affinity-based ethos of
crowdfunding. Since Marillion’s 1997 United States tour, numerous
other musicians, artists, writers, and other creative producers have turned
to crowdfunding to collect money for their projects.56 Such projects now
are often described as “donation,” “rewards-based,” or “pre-order”
crowdfunding, based on what the crowdfunders receive in return for their
funds, such as a discounted copy of the eventual product, other
promotional items, or various tokens of gratitude.57 For many
crowdfunders, providing money for these projects is an exercise in
patronage—that is, the donation is made out of affinity for the artist, art,
or product, rather than a desire for the reward itself.
Donation, rewards-based, and pre-order crowdfunding are not
limited to creative ventures. Producers of many varieties launch
crowdfunding campaigns as a part of pre-marketing or even preproducing their products, or to market-test a new line.58 Further, there are
several non-equity crowdfunding platforms devoted to general-purpose
entrepreneurship and business ideas across a multitude of industries.59
The other major form of donation or rewards-based crowdfunding is
the charitable micro-lending form best exemplified by Kiva.60 Founded
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See Bradford, supra note 43, at 12 nn.22–23, 13 n.29.
57. See Seth C. Oranburg, The Non-Pecuniary Value of Equity Crowdfunding 3
(Chi.-Kent Coll. of Law, Research Paper No. 2015-10, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2620011.
58. See Ryan Underwood, 3 Smart Ways to Use Data When Developing Products,
INC., Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014, https://www.inc.com/magazine/201312/ryan-underwood/
how-to-put-data-in-product-development.html (describing the use of crowdfunding as a
“proof-of-concept tool”).
59. For example, Peerbackers bills itself as “the first crowdfunding platform for
entrepreneurs.” See About the Team, PEERBACKERS, http://peerbackers.com/about.html
(last visited Oct. 9, 2017); see also Bradford, supra note 43, at 12 nn.23–27 (listing
crowdfunding sites for various industries).
60. See The Journey of a Kiva Loan, KIVA, https://www.kiva.org/about/how (last
visited Oct. 9, 2017). Closely related—perhaps as a precursor to charitable microlending—are micro-finance organizations that loan money to the poor, but collect interest
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in 2005, Kiva is a platform where crowdfunders provide small amounts
of money to be loaned to micro-entrepreneurs in the developing world.61
The loans carry no interest but are to be repaid.62 According to the site,
most Kiva donors simply roll their “returns” into other loans.63 Kiva’s
version of crowdfunding is charitable in nature—again, no Kiva
crowdfunder expects investment-style returns in exchange for providing
capital.64
B. Hurtling Toward Investment Crowdfunding: Debt and Equity
Given the success stories of donation, rewards-based, and pre-order
crowdfunding, there inevitably emerged a desire, by entrepreneurs and
potential crowd investors alike, for a way to utilize crowdfunding
platforms for financial investments. Not only were the non-investment
crowdfunding platforms a new way to raise money, they also opened up
a new class of potential investors.65
Small businesses or fast-growing startups66 almost invariably find
themselves in need of substantial seed, growth, and operating capital.
Traditional sources of capital begin with friends and family,67 or a
dedicated group of other, more established business people—known as
“angel” investors—who provide capital along with mentorship,
management expertise, or other resources.68 These resources are limited;
venturers only have so many friends, may not have family members with
substantial resources, may not be able to persuade bankers of the
viability of their product or service, and may not have the personal and
geographic connections that usually lead to a pitch meeting with angel
investors or other venture capitalists.69 Likewise, venture capitalists
and retain earnings much like banks. See Michael S. Barr, Microfinance and Financial
Development, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 271, 278–79 (2004).
61. See The Journey of a Kiva Loan, supra note 60.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. (stating that Kiva borrowers pay no interest to lenders or Kiva).
65. See generally Andrew Schwartz, The Digital Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV.
609, 615 (2015) (stating that moving from non-investment to investment crowdfunding
takes the model “one step further”).
66. Discussion of investment crowdfunding often appears in the context of fastgrowing startups, which burn through capital quickly before eventually maturing into a
larger enterprise or being acquired by one. See Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23,
at 405. Nonetheless, crowdfunding may be viable in “permanently” small businesses. See
Schwartz, supra note 65, at 624 (describing crowdfunding as a source of financing for
businesses outside the traditional Silicon Valley startup model).
67. And “fools,” as they are sometimes called.
68. See Seth C. Oranburg, A Place of Their Own: Crowds in the New Market for
Equity Crowdfunding, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 147, 150 (2016).
69. See id. at 150 (discussing the personal networks of professional investors in
Silicon Valley); see also Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed
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primarily invest in fast-growing startups only after some proof of
viability, in hopes of landing huge returns on scalable ventures.70 For a
small, local, or community-based business, the relevant scale is less steep
and the possibility of a grand future payday may be remote, even if longterm profitability is achievable.
On the investor side, many people participate in some form of
investing, even if only through a retirement account or placing savings
within various “retail” investment funds such as mutual funds. Many
more people participate in social networking, with networks or subnetworks coalescing around common interests. Contributing to a
Kickstarter71 in return for a first-run version of the product, or even a tshirt, represents a tangible connection to the relevant community of
common interest.72 Another notable example is that of the fans of the
National Football League’s Green Bay Packers, who have on multiple
occasions rushed to purchase “shares” of the football team, despite the
fact that such shares never pay dividends, cannot be resold, and
otherwise have no tangible market value.73 The football team has used
funds raised from the sale of these largely valueless shares to fund the
continued residence of the team in Green Bay, Wisconsin, and several
capital-intensive improvements to their facilities.74 How different, then,
is a “real,” even if small, investment in a business or idea? At least in
theory, crowdfunding connects small businesses or startups in need of
capital with a new class of investors, brought together by common
interest, the networking power of the Internet, and perhaps a nonfinancial affinity for the people, products, or services at the heart of the
business.
There is only one small hurdle: selling equity to a large group of
investors quite clearly is an offering of securities subject to the Securities
at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 931–
32 (2011).
70. See Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 410–11.
71. Kickstarter is among the more well known crowdfunding platforms. Essentially,
any person can post a “project” and seek donations from the crowd. See generally About
Us, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/about?ref=nav (last visited Oct. 10,
2017). The site began as an alternative funding source for creative projects, but many
entrepreneurs have used it to test more traditional business ideas. Id.; see also
Technology, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/discover/categories/technology?
ref=footer (last visited Oct. 10, 2017).
72. See Chaboud, supra note 50, at 79 (discussing the manner in which donation
crowdfunding endeavors to tap into particular communities of interest). See generally
Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 69 (discussing crowdfunders as consumer-investors
whose investments may derive from a passion for the product or service).
73. See GREEN BAY PACKERS, INC., COMMON STOCK OFFERING DOCUMENT 4 (2011),
http://shareholder.broadridge.com/pdf/gbp/gbp_2011_offering_document.pdf.
74. See id. at ii (describing 2003 and 2011 offerings as being conducted for stadium
improvements).
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Act of 193375 (the “1933 Act”),76 not to mention state securities laws.77
Section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act defines “security” broadly to include
essentially any sale of an investment opportunity.78 In SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co.,79 the United States Supreme Court adopted a similarly broad
definition of “investment contract” under Section 2(a)(1), finding within
the reach of the 1933 Act any “contract, transaction or scheme whereby a
person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”80 The
breadth of the 1933 Act established the essential framework for securities
law: all public offerings of securities must be registered in accordance
with the 1933 Act and relevant implementing regulations, unless some
exemption applies.81
Because crowdfunded sales of debt or equity in a venture are
subject to the 1933 Act, Congress enacted the JOBS Act, which included
the CROWDFUND Act.82 The latter instructed the SEC to implement an
exemption for crowdfunding.83 The SEC finalized “Regulation
Crowdfund,” or “Regulation CF,” on October 30, 2015, and the rules
became effective on May 16, 2016.84 Reception of the CROWDFUND
Act and its implementing regulations has been lukewarm, at best.85 The
specific provisions are beyond the scope of this article, but suffice to say,
the Act and regulations—at a minimum—create a legal avenue for
experimenting with crowdfunding.
As with most investments, crowdfunding can take the form of debt
or equity. Peer-to-peer lending networks, such as Lending Club, are a
75. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74.
76. For a thorough and conclusive analysis on this matter, see Heminway &
Hoffman, supra note 69, at 882–906.
77. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 73-101(b), -103(a)(20) (2017) (definition of
“security”).
78. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).
79. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
80. Id. at 298–99.
81. See Heminway, supra note 1, at 481.
82. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 301, 126 Stat. 306,
314–15 (2012).
83. See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387, 71,389 (Nov. 15, 2015) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239–40, 249, 269, 274) (describing Title III of the JOBS
Act and the SEC’s role in implementing the legislation and citing its statutory authority);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(6) (authorizing the SEC to exempt transactions as set forth in
the JOBS Act).
84. See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,537, 71,611.
85. Most commentators have been critical of the exemption, suggesting it is too
costly and too slow to achieve its stated purpose of connecting potential crowd investors
with small businesses and startups who could benefit from crowdfunding. See, e.g.,
Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 418 (citing figures suggesting that a round of
$100,000 of investment could cost as much as $39,000); see also supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
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form of debt crowdfunding.86 The basic premise is that an individual or
small business applies for a loan amount, Lending Club computes the
credit risk factors, and then loan investors choose whether or not to fund
them.87 Similarly, many current crowdfunding portals include offerings
of short- or long-term notes.88 Debt crowdfunding, however, is not the
focus of this article—offering notes and seeking loans from investors do
not implicate the internal workings of a corporation.89 This article
focuses on equity crowdfunding, where the utilization of crowdfunding
results in new shareholders being welcomed to the venture.
III. A SORT OF DIVIDE: INTRACORPORATE DISPUTES LARGE AND
SMALL
Public corporations and close corporations, and the disputes that
arise within each, are different because of the differences in formal
separation of the roles of shareholder, officer, and director, the exercise
of corporate decision-making power, and the market for resale of shares.
Courts and legislatures have devised special protections for close
corporation non-controlling shareholders to mitigate the effects of losing
their roles and financial interests through otherwise permissible business
decisions such as termination from employment and removal from
companies’ boards. These protections are special—they expand the
rights of a non-controlling shareholder beyond the formal rights
contained within most general corporation statutes. Courts usually rely
on two justifications for providing these special protections. First, close
corporation shareholders usually trust each other more than typical coventurers because of preexisting family or social relationships. Because
of their lack of resources and this implicit trust, they do not develop and
negotiate minority protections or contingencies for disputes or engage
counsel to do so for them. Because of this observed lack of contracting,
courts have concluded that requiring such contracting can be
impracticable and unfair. Second, and similarly, the lack of contracting
and the more discernible course of dealing among close corporation
shareholders permit courts to draw relatively strong inferences about the
reasonable expectations of minority shareholders with respect to their
roles and financial interests in the venture.
86. See generally LendingClub Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 6–7 (Feb. 28,
2017) (describing how borrowers apply for loans and investors invest in loans).
87. See id. at 9–10.
88. See, e.g., Brewtex, LLC, Offering Statement (Form C) (Apr. 28, 2017) (offering
promissory notes in increments of one dollar to fund development of a craft beer-themed
event complex).
89. See Ibrahim, supra note 25, at 563 (“From a legal perspective, equity
crowdfunding is the far more interesting of the two types . . . .”).
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A. The Public Corporation as the Paradigm of the Corporate Form
Corporations, axiomatically, are creatures of numerous state
statutes, each of which sets forth the package of formal features of the
arrangement known as the “corporation.”90 Since the advent of general
incorporation statutes—as opposed to the requirement of a legislative
charter—state corporation law has applied rigidly to all corporations,
regardless of size, value, or number of shareholders.91 Most corporation
statutes establish the following general attributes: “formal creation as
prescribed by state law; legal personality; separation of ownership and
control; freely alienable ownership interests; indefinite duration; and
limited liability.”92 Resting atop these identifying features of the
corporation is the equally important package of rights, responsibilities,
and duties that exist among the corporate players themselves: the
shareholders, officers, and directors.93
Generally, shareholders invest capital in return for the right to the
residual value of the corporation, and exercise their voice in corporate
affairs by voting on the election of directors.94 Shareholders also may
freely sell their shares.95 Directors, as a board, possess all corporate
decision-making power, which is exercised through majority vote of the
board.96 Officers manage the corporate assets and act on behalf of the
corporation under the supervision of the board of directors.97 As a
default, the shareholder vote on the election of directors and the director
vote on matters of corporate policy require only a simple majority—
minority shareholders can lose a vote on the election of directors, and
directors can lose a vote on matters of corporate policy.98
At the significant economic inflection point of the Great
Depression, federal regulation of the sale of securities imparted a drastic
change to corporation law.99 The 1933 Act and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934100 (the “1934 Act”) imposed significant regulatory
obligations on corporations with substantial numbers of outstanding
90. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ch. 1 (2017).
91. See Dennis S. Karjala, An Analysis of Close Corporation Legislation in the
United States, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663, 664 (1989).
92. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 2 (2d ed. 2009).
93. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141–174; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT chs.
7–8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
94. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28.
95. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 92, at 6.
96. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b).
97. E.g., id. § 142.
98. E.g., id. § 216(2).
99. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in
Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 344 (2013).
100. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881.
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shares of stock and those who wished to become such corporations.101
That is, corporations that arguably were relatively larger—in number of
shareholders, asset value, and other indicators—became subject to the
newly-extended reach of federal regulatory jurisdiction.
As federal securities regulation pressured corporations seeking
wider sources of capital to engage in cost-increasing reporting and
disclosure activities, state law liberalized in ways that were often more
beneficial or efficient in the context of the large, public corporation.102
Larger and more sophisticated corporations with the resources to engage
expensive counsel could assemble the appropriate set of statutory
features while efficiently navigating formalities and regulatory
requirements. In a sense, this reflected a fair trade for the economically
valuable features of the corporate form. Those wishing to avail
themselves of limited liability, legal personality, and the other desirable
features of the corporate form could bear the costs of navigating
formalities and regulatory requirements. Furthermore, small groups
intent upon carrying on a profitable enterprise could utilize the tried-andtrue partnership form, with its heightened partner-to-partner fiduciary
obligations, less rigorous formal requirements, and dissolution-at-will.103
Given the historical development of the law regarding public
corporations, the principles espoused in most states’ general corporation
laws fit best in the public corporation context.104
B. Close Corporations and the Blurring of the Roles
Limited liability and perpetual existence are desirable features for
anyone seeking to operate a business, not just those looking to
accumulate and deploy relatively large amounts of capital.105 Some
“small” businesses may achieve relative largeness by asset value without
the capital accumulating power of public equity markets.106 The
101. See id.
102. See Karjala, supra note 91, at 666. Further, Delaware became the most
prominent state for incorporation, ostensibly because its corporation law is “enabling” or
“liberal” relative to other states. See Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom”
Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW.
U. L. REV. 913, 913 (1982).
103. See Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 545–48 (Tex. 1998)
(discussing fiduciary duties and the at-will nature of the partnership relationship).
104. Some commentators suggest these principles only fit large, public corporations.
See ROBERT A. RAGAZZO & FRANCES S. FENDLER, CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 341 (2d ed. 2012) (“The requirements for formal board action often
make little sense . . . [w]hen all of the shareholders are directors and participate in the
management of the business . . . .”).
105. See Karjala, supra note 91, at 677.
106. For example, Cargill, Inc., one of the world’s largest private corporations, was
valued at approximately $55 billion based upon figures made public during a 2011
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business’s smaller number of private shareholders or early market
success may deliver substantial capital, or the peculiarities of its product
or service may counsel against seeking public investment.107 This kind of
relative largeness makes limited liability valuable and the unlimited
liability of the partnership form undesirable.108 Despite potential misfit,
smaller businesses with no intention of becoming large or public adopted
the corporate form to achieve limited liability.109 As a result, these firms
also accepted the permanence, majority-rules power structure, and rigid
formal roles of shareholders, officers, and directors.110 Despite using the
same package of features, the expectations, motivations, and incentives
of the primary players in close corporations are very different than those
of the primary players in the typical public corporation.111
Investors in public corporations are almost exclusively “mere”
shareholders.112 Their investment decisions revolve around financial
returns, and they lack significant personal interest in the operation or
management of the corporation, unless particularly bad management
conduct harms the investors’ financial interests.113 Furthermore, vesting
corporate power and discretion with a smaller group of directors is
considered a competitive advantage of the corporate form.114 Public
spinoff. See Lisa Lee, Cargill Valuation Validates Wall St Rules of Thumb, REUTERS
(Jan. 20, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/breakingviews/2011/01/20/cargill-valuationvalidates-wall-st-rules-of-thumb/.
107. See Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 406 (describing the limited
utility of equity investment in very small businesses).
108. Modern hybrid entities, such as limited liability companies, provide the
protection of limited liability but with more flexible governance features than general
corporation law. See Wayne M. Gazur, The Limited Liability Company Experiment:
Unlimited Flexibility, Uncertain Role, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 139 (describing
flexibility as part of the “original mission” of the limited liability company).
109. See Karjala, supra note 91, at 677.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 888–89.
112. Id.
113. Some commentators have argued that the view of the dispersed, passive
shareholder is no longer an accurate representation of the reality of the public
corporation. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffery N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 864 (2013) (describing the paradigm of the
dispersed class of shareholders as “obsolete” in light of substantial institutional investor
ownership of shares); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A
Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate
Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1871–72 (2017) (proposing a paradigm shift in
the view of the individual public shareholder from an activism perspective). But see
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1735, 1752 (2006) (arguing that the costs of corporate governance activism in
most cases generally will not exceed the benefits that might be expected to derive from
that activism).
114. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 555–56 (2003).
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corporation shareholders’ ability to sell their shares in a liquid market
provides recourse for poor performance or disagreement with director or
manager decision-making—a consideration known as “exit.”115 Exit, in
turn, increases efficiency by providing a measure of market discipline.116
On the other hand, shareholders in close corporations often are not
mere shareholders. These shareholders often serve as officers who have
invested not only capital, but also substantial opportunity costs in their
ventures.117 Rounding out their roles, they also serve as directors, taking
an active role in fundamental business decisions.118 Thus, many actors in
close corporations are best identified as “shareholder-officer-directors,”
assuming and performing all roles in the life of the business at various
times. Because the relatively small number of shareholder-officerdirectors makes communication and coordination of decision-making
easy, the parties often—or at least occasionally—forgo required
formalities such as board meetings and recorded votes.119 Shareholderofficer-directors in close corporations also expect that their personal
financial success will flow from direct participation in the business as an
officer and director with a salary and benefits.120 Consequently, most
shareholder-officer-directors do not expect that their equity ownership in
the company will be the primary source of the financial return on their
investment.121 This “intimate, illiquid”122 arrangement is suitable, unless
conflict emerges between the shareholder-officer-directors.
When a conflict between the majority and minority emerges, the
rigid and formal majority-rules power structure becomes of renewed
importance. Using the formal authority of the corporation—authority that
perhaps has not been exercised since the inception of the business—a
controlling shareholder-officer-director can not only outvote a minority
shareholder-officer-director on the substantive issue leading to the
115. See Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of
Minority Shareholder Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1217
(2009).
116. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency
Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 291–93 (1986) (proposing that managers of public
corporations who make errors should be subject to market discipline).
117. See, e.g., In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (addressing
a case where a minority shareholder invested substantial assets and worked for a close
corporation, giving rise to expectation of participation in the business’s financial
success).
118. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659–60
(Mass. 1976) (discussing a corporation where all shareholders also served as officers and
directors).
119. See Karjala, supra note 91, at 698–99.
120. See Ragazzo, supra note 8, at 1107–11.
121. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 372–73 (discussing the loss in value of an
investment when employment is terminated).
122. Id. at 3.
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disagreement, but can also unceremoniously remove him or her from the
board and terminate the minority shareholder from his or her officer
position.123 The result of these actions is to silence the minority
shareholder’s voice in corporate affairs. Yet again, illiquidity of close
corporation stock, as well as other restrictions on transfers, makes exiting
the close corporation untenable for the newly silent minority
shareholder.124 No longer earning the salary and benefits that once
represented his or her financial return for participation in the venture, the
minority shareholder typically is offered a fire-sale amount for his or her
equity stake, thus completing what sometimes is described as a
“freezeout,” “squeezeout,” or more generally, “oppression.”125
Rigid formal organization works efficiently enough for large
corporations that operate with no confusion about the roles and
responsibilities of individuals within the corporation. There is no
confusion about Mark Zuckerberg’s roles as an officer, director, and
public shareholder of Facebook. To illustrate the contrast to the close
corporation, consider a small corporation consisting of three shareholderofficer-directors: A, B, and C. In this hypothetical firm, the formal
divisions and allocation of power become somewhat of a second thought.
A, B, and C decide to start an artisanal hamburger restaurant, “The
Burger Joint,” and form a corporation under the general corporation law
of their state. Each owns an equal equity stake in the corporation,
maintains one of three seats on the board of directors, and participates
fully in the day-to-day operations of the business as an officer. Perhaps
for perfectly rational reasons, they decide not to clutter their by-laws or
stockholder agreement with buyout procedures or alter the default,
majority-rules decision process. Bound by pre-existing social
relationships, the three defy the odds and steer the fledgling restaurant to
initial success, while acting harmoniously as shareholder-officerdirectors. They split the profits evenly by paying themselves monthly
salaries,126 which grow larger as the business thrives. In fact, it is likely
A, B, and C rarely consider what roles they are playing in the day-to-day
operation of the business, perfectly content with growing profits and
wealth.
After the initial meeting, the three do not call annual shareholder
meetings or have board meetings—after all, the business is successful
and everyone is on the same page with respect to all major corporate
123. See Moll, supra note 7, at 890–91.
124. See Means, supra note 115, at 1217.
125. See Moll, supra note 7, at 889–91 (describing the sequence of a typical
freezeout).
126. The venturers likely chose this method over the payment of dividends on their
shares to avoid income tax at the corporate level and at the individual level.
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decisions. A few years later, however, a small disagreement emerges
between A, B, and C. A and B wish to franchise the business due to the
potential to further increase earnings and expand the restaurant’s
geographic footprint, despite the increased cost and managerial
complexity that comes along with franchising. C disagrees, preferring the
status quo and not wishing to assume the additional cost and complexity
of running a franchised chain of burger joints. A and B realize that they
outnumber C, and call the first board meeting in years to vote on whether
to franchise the burger joint. As fait accompli would have it, A and B
vote for the franchise plan and C casts her hopeless vote against it. As
the franchising operations begin, C begrudgingly continues working with
her fellow shareholder-officer-directors. Nonetheless, she cannot help
but continue to voice her displeasure to A and B, who grow tired of the
disagreement. The relationship between the once-unanimous group
sours, leading A and B to conclude that it is beyond repair. At the next
meeting of the shareholders, A and B decline to vote C to another term as
a director. At the subsequent board meeting, A and B vote to terminate
C’s employment. They also vote to continue their practice of not paying
dividends, while voting to increase their own salaries; it is only fair, in
their view, because they will now have increased workloads as a result of
C’s termination.
Over the course of this intracorporate disagreement, C’s position
diminishes from equal participation in the business through her
employment and salary to only holding her equity stake. She is now
merely a shareholder and no longer a shareholder-officer-director.
Critically, unlike a large, public corporation shareholder, C is unable to
sell her equity stake in any identifiable market. Furthermore, A and B do
not wish—and have no incentive—to buy C out. C is now stuck with no
salary, no dividends, and no role in the corporation of which she still
owns one-third.
C. The Judicial and Legislative Response
C’s story is a familiar one in close corporations. The blurring of the
roles of the shareholder-officer-directors seems unimportant when the
parties agree on all relevant matters, but the formalities of the exercise of
corporate decision-making authority become painfully concrete when
disagreement occurs. It was this kind of dispute that encouraged
legislatures and courts in a number of jurisdictions to recognize remedies
for “oppressed” minority shareholders of close corporations. These
remedies include judicial recognition of a heightened fiduciary duty
owed to the minority, enactment of statutory provisions for involuntary
dissolution of the corporation or a buyout of the minority, and
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development of a judicial analysis of the minority’s reasonable
expectations regarding participation in the enterprise as the definition of
oppression.127
1. Heightened Fiduciary Duties
While the first known “oppression” cases date to the late nineteenth
century,128 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided the
seminal oppression case in 1975. In Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of
New England, Inc.,129 the court concluded that controlling shareholders
in close corporations owe an independent and heightened duty of fairness
to minority shareholders.130 Generally, there are no duties or obligations
flowing between and among shareholders qua shareholders under general
corporate principles as there are between partners in a partnership.131
The dispute in Donahue involved a stock repurchase, which is a
common maneuver in corporations large and small, but for different
reasons.132 Harry Rodd, his sons, and a loyal corporate lawyer who was
127. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 386–90. Another development was permitting
traditionally derivative actions to be brought as direct actions where an individual
shareholder was oppressed in a manner that also harmed the corporation in a derivative
sense. Id. at 29; cf. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661
(Mass. 1976) (describing a situation where the only harm was the corporation’s refusal to
employ and compensate the minority shareholder); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of
New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 510–11 (Mass. 1975) (describing a situation where corporate
assets were depleted to repurchase the majority shareholder’s shares).
128. See, e.g., Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 53 N.W. 218, 223 (Mich. 1892)
(Campbell, J., dissenting).
129. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
130. Id. at 515–16.
131. See id. The analogy of the close corporation to the partnership animates some of
the existing authority applying heightened fiduciary duties in the close corporation
context, where partners do owe fiduciary duties to one another as partners. See
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 560–61 (N.C. 1983) (describing the
“partnership analogy” and applying North Carolina’s dissolution provision under its
general corporation law); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 116, at 297–300 (1986)
(evaluating the “partnership analogy” as the basis for applying heightened duties in close
corporations); see also O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION, supra note 38, § 7.5. The
partnership analogy is particularly relevant because traditionally partnerships did not
exist perpetually and therefore partners could withdraw the value of their interest in the
partnership as a matter of law. See generally Rev. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 601 cmt. 1, 603
cmt. 1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2013) (discussing the
differences between the Uniform Partnership Act and the Revised Uniform Partnership
Act on whether the partnership is dissolved when a partner withdraws). Though the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act does not require dissolution and winding up of the
partnership when a partner withdraws as its predecessor Uniform Partnership Act did, a
partner has the power to withdraw from the partnership and the right to receive some
form of a buyout upon disassociation. See Rev. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT. § 701(a)–(b), 701 cmt.
1.
132. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 510; see The Repurchase Revolution; Share Buy-Backs,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 2014, at 71 (describing share repurchases in large corporations as
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also a director utilized their voting power on the board of Rodd
Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc. to cause the corporation to
purchase outstanding stock held by Harry Rodd.133 The Donahues
requested that their shares be repurchased on the same terms, but the
request was refused.134 The practical result, then, was that the Rodds
voted themselves a distribution of corporate assets and denied the
Donahues such a distribution135—it was economically similar to the
Rodds voting to declare dividends to be paid only on their own shares.136
The court ultimately justified its departure from general corporate
principles in part on the theory that close corporations involved a greater
level of trust and confidence than is found in public corporations.137
The rule from Donahue figured prominently in a later
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case, Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc.138 Wilkes, compared to Donahue, may be more
exemplary of the “freezeout” genre. Four shareholder-officer-directors
shared roughly equal parts in the ownership, management, and control of
a corporation whose primary business was operating a nursing home.139
“Bad blood” brewed between the plaintiff, Wilkes, and another
shareholder-officer-director, Quinn.140 The non-belligerent parties sided
financial “sorcery” utilized to merely reshuffle the capital structure of the corporation
without changing its underlying value); see also Ira Kay, Executive Pay, Share Buybacks,
and Managerial Short-Termism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(Jan. 26, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/01/26/executive-pay-sharebuybacks-and-managerial-short-termism/ (presenting research on, inter alia, whether
managers of large, public corporations effect share buybacks to increase the value of
stock options to high-level managers).
133. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 510.
134. Id. at 510–11. Notably, in the four or five years prior to the repurchase, the
majority offered to repurchase the Donahues’ shares, but at prices 5 to 25 percent ($40–
$200 per share) of the ultimate price paid to Rodd ($800 per share). See id. at 511 n.10.
135. Id. at 519–20.
136. Id. at 518–19. The court also acknowledged the Donahues’ inability to exit the
corporation due to the non-marketability of their shares and that the opportunity to
recover the full value of their ownership interests in the corporation was completely at the
discretion of the Rodds. Id. at 519–20; see also Means, supra note 115, at 1217.
137. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515–17. The court would later observe that “[n]o
outsider would knowingly assume the position of the disadvantaged minority,” id. at 515,
implying that contractual arrangements might not be sufficient to protect non-controlling
shareholders.
138. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
139. Id. at 659–60.
140. Id. at 660. According to the court, the dispute emerged when Wilkes persuaded
the two non-belligerents to demand a higher price for the sale to Quinn of a piece of
property owned by the corporation. Id. Apparently, Quinn expected to purchase the
property at a below-market price. See Eric J. Gouvin, Fiduciary Duties in the Closely
Held Firm 35 Years After Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home: Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc.: The Backstory, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 269, 275–80 (2011)
(suggesting Quinn regularly negotiated and maintained sweetheart deals for himself).
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with Quinn, voting at board and shareholder meetings to terminate
Wilkes’s employment and dismiss him from the board of directors.141
With his money locked in and his influence locked out, Wilkes sued the
remaining shareholder-officer-directors, alleging, inter alia, that they
breached their fiduciary duties owed to him as a minority shareholder.142
Though the court cautioned against an “untempered application” of the
Donahue rule—that is, the court clarified that Donahue was not meant to
foreclose potentially oppressive decisions made for “legitimate business
purpose[s]”—it ruled in Wilkes’s favor, granting him his lost salary and
remanding for a measure of his damages.143 Similar to its analysis in
Donahue, the Wilkes court relied upon the extent to which the closeness
of the relationships among the parties justified heightened judicial
scrutiny.144 Further, the court made several important references to
understandings of the parties that were not set forth explicitly in any
written form.145
Some form of the rule established in Donahue and Wilkes exists in a
number of states.146 Nonetheless, Professors Robert B. Thompson and
Mary Siegel have both noted that the heightened fiduciary duties version
of oppression is not the most common or popular avenue for providing a
remedy to an oppressed minority shareholder.147 As Professor Thompson
observes, the rule from Donahue and Wilkes has stood the test of time
more as a reflection of the general principles of oppression than for the
use of heightened fiduciary duties as the mode of establishing grounds
for relief.148 Today, the more common mode of relief is through statutes
defining oppression and establishing specific forms of relief.149

141. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 660–61.
142. Id. at 659.
143. Id. at 663–65.
144. Id. at 663–64.
145. See id. at 660 (explaining that all the parties “understood” that their ownership
and management of the firm would be conducted as equal partners).
146. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION, supra note 38, §§ 7.4–.5 (collecting
and analyzing cases applying a heightened or partnership-style fiduciary duty in close
corporations); Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 377, 381–82 (2004); see also Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 906 n.52 (Tex.
2014) (Guzman, J., dissenting) (citing cases where state courts adopted heightened
fiduciary duties as a remedy for minority shareholder oppression); Thompson, supra note
7, at 388–89.
147. Siegel, supra note 146, at 382; Thompson, supra note 6, at 369–70.
148. Thompson, supra note 6, at 371. Notably, the heightened fiduciary duties rule
for oppression was adopted as a matter of first impression as recently as 2009. See
McLaughlin v. Schenk, 220 P.3d 146, 156 (Utah 2009). Alas, the Utah legislature acted
quickly to overturn McLaughlin, passing the following unequivocal statutory language:
“A shareholder of a corporation, when acting solely in the capacity of a shareholder, has
no fiduciary duty or other similar duty to any other shareholder of the corporation,
including not having a duty of care, loyalty, or utmost good faith.” UTAH CODE ANN.
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2. Statutory Dissolution and Buyout Remedies
Because Massachusetts’s corporation law at the time Donahue and
Wilkes were decided did not contain any particular statutory
authorization to remedy oppression, the court developed the theory of
heightened fiduciary duties.150 In addition, no statute provided any
specific remedy. Thus, the Wilkes court ordered money damages, while
the Donahue court crafted two primarily equitable solutions.151
Legislative solutions to the plight of the close corporation minority
shareholder not only established a basis for relief from oppressive acts,
but also propounded specific remedies. In general terms, these remedies
involve empowering courts to equitably abrogate the corporation’s
traditionally perpetual existence in some way—such as ordering the
dissolution of the entity. As a perpetually existing entity, a corporation
does not cease to exist even if the shareholders find themselves in a
protracted dispute, and no shareholder may simply “redeem” his or her
stock for market, fair, or even book value. The most common legislative
solutions include statutory “equitable” remedies such as dissolution or
buyout provisions for oppression.152
An exemplary case is Meiselman v. Meiselman.153 The case
emerged from an internecine dispute between two scions of a burgeoning
movie theater and commercial real estate empire.154 A common tale in
close corporations, the story begins with the litigants’ father, H.B.
Meiselman, who built the empire brick by brick.155 Between 1951 and
1971, H.B. methodically transferred his interests in the constellation of
§ 16-10a-622(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2017); see also McLaughlin v. Schenk, 299 P.3d 1139,
1145 (Utah 2013).
149. O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION, supra note 38, § 7.11 (noting that 39 states
have oppression statutes).
150. Massachusetts’s statutes still do not provide for dissolution or any other
statutory remedy for oppression. See Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1082 n.7 (Mass.
2006).
151. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 664–65 (Mass.
1976) (ordering that plaintiff minority shareholder be paid damages equal to his lost
salary and benefits); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505,
521 (Mass. 1975) (ordering defendant majority shareholder to either (1) return $36,000
plus interest to the corporation in exchange for the treasury shares he caused the
corporation to purchase from him or (2) cause the corporation to buy out the minority
shareholder for $36,000).
152. Ritchie v. Rupe provides an excellent 50-state survey of states that allow
liquidation for oppressive or similar conduct. Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 894–95
& nn.12–14 (Tex. 2014). As a procedural matter, some states, such as Texas, conduct
dissolution or buyout through appointment of a receiver to run the corporation while the
court’s resolution of the dispute is carried out. See id. at 863.
153. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983).
154. Id. at 553–54.
155. Id. at 553.
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family corporations to his sons, Michael and Ira, who began working in
the family business in 1956 and 1965, respectively.156 H.B.’s last large
transfer of his corporate interests in 1971 fell overwhelmingly to Ira,
leaving Ira in control of all but one of the corporations within the
empire.157
The Meiselman opinion suggests that the brothers’ personal and
business relationship soured between 1971 and 1979, as Ira ascended to
the operation and management of the primary corporation, Eastern
Federal.158 The controversy ultimately giving rise to the litigation began
when Michael filed a lawsuit challenging Ira’s sole ownership of a
management corporation, Republic, which earned income from a
services contract with Eastern.159 Republic employed Michael and was
the current iteration of several prior management entities utilized to
account for management costs shared across the other corporations that
Michael and Ira had owned jointly.160 Further, Michael’s primary
participation in the family business, at least from a financial perspective,
was through his employment with Republic.161 Ira responded to the
lawsuit by causing the two corporations to cease their management
contract, and caused Republic to terminate Michael’s employment,
salary, and benefits.162 The practical effect of the termination of both the
contract and Michael’s employment was to exclude him completely from
any role in the day-to-day operation of the business and limit his
financial participation.163
Michael sued his brother under North Carolina’s general
corporation law, which, at the time, contained provisions for equitable
dissolution or other equitable judicial remedies to protect the interests of
minority shareholders.164 Michael pled two theories. First, he claimed
156. Id. at 553–54.
157. Id. at 553.
158. Id. at 554–55. H.B. passed away in 1978, roughly one year prior to the
beginning of the litigation. Id. at 556.
159. Id. at 554–55. The crux of Michael’s initial lawsuit was that Ira’s sole
ownership of Republic entitled him to an unfair share of the income of the overall
enterprise through Republic’s earnings. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 555.
162. Id. at 554.
163. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 555. Ira’s litigation position was that Michael was not
so excluded, noting that Michael was not banned from company property or denied notice
of stockholder meetings. Id. The court noted, however, that it was “struck by the tone of
Ira’s comments” about his brother’s participation in the management and direction of the
business. Id.
164. Id. at 556. At the time, the North Carolina Business Corporation Act
(N.C.B.C.A.) contained provisions permitting dissolution and a broad menu of other
equitable oppression remedies such as buyouts and even canceling corporate acts. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1 (1982), replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-14-30 to -31 (2017).
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that Ira was responsible to the corporation derivatively for incorporating
a management company owned solely by him and causing Eastern
Federal to pay the solely owned management company compensation.165
Second, he requested the court use its equitable authority under Section
55-125.1(a)(4) of the North Carolina Business Corporation Act to
compel a buyout of his interests in the corporation, claiming that a
buyout was necessary to protect his rights and interests.166
The court began its analysis by recognizing a distinction between
“close” corporations and “publicly-held” corporations.167 Describing the
former as “incorporated partnerships,” the court discussed the potentially
oppressive circumstances giving rise to a wave of commentary on close
corporations.168 Notably, the court considered and rejected the argument
that pre-incorporation contracting presents an adequate opportunity to
avoid oppression.169 It reasoned that most minority shareholders purchase
their shares with unequal bargaining power and without even considering
the possibility of bargaining for minority protections.170
The court set forth the following analytical framework for
oppression under the North Carolina statute: the court observed that the
statutory “rights and interests” language represented those rights
belonging particularly to the complaining shareholder.171 Having defined
the “rights and interests” as particular to the complaining shareholder, as
opposed to shareholders generally, the court then confirmed that it would
follow the analysis of courts that had established the shareholder’s
“reasonable expectations” as the criterion for oppression.172 The court
presented its reasonable expectations analysis as follows:
For plaintiff to obtain relief under the expectations’ analysis, he must
prove that (1) he had one or more substantial reasonable expectations
known or assumed by the other participants; (2) the expectation has

In 1990, the broad equitable remedies provision was replaced. See Robert S. McLean,
Minority Shareholders’ Rights in the Close Corporation Under the New North Carolina
Business Corporation Act, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1109, 1120–21 (1990). Judicial dissolution is
the only remaining remedy under the N.C.B.C.A., but the corporation may elect to buy
out the complaining shareholder if involuntary dissolution is ordered. See id.; see also
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-31(d).
165. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 556.
166. Id. The requested buyout was the only remedy before the North Carolina
Supreme Court. Id.
167. Id. at 557–61.
168. Id. at 558–59.
169. Id. at 558; cf. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993).
170. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 558 (citing J.A.C. Hetherington, Special
Characteristics, Problems, and Needs of the Close Corporation, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 17–
18).
171. Id. at 562.
172. Id. at 563.
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been frustrated; (3) the frustration was without fault of plaintiff and was
in large part beyond his control; and (4) under all of the circumstances
173
of the case, plaintiff is entitled to some form of equitable relief.

As the Massachusetts court did in Donahue and Wilkes, the North
Carolina court fashioned and applied its analysis on the basis that the
close corporation shareholder possesses rights and interests beyond the
usual interests of shareholders set forth in general corporation statutes.174
Whether articulated as heightened, shareholder-to-shareholder fiduciary
duty, or applied as a statutory oppression remedy, the crux of the
oppression doctrine is that it carves out a special rule for close
corporation majority shareholders from the general corporation law.
Nonetheless, not every state recognizes a doctrine of minority
oppression. Delaware, for its enormous influence over corporate law,
stands in the minority with respect to the oppression doctrine.
D. Non-Starters: Delaware and Texas
Delaware has no legislative or judicial exceptions for relatively
close corporations incorporated under its general corporation law. In
Nixon v. Blackwell,175 the Delaware Supreme Court had occasion to
analyze an alleged instance of minority shareholder oppression reflected
in several majority-beneficial corporate policies that created limitedpurpose opportunities for certain shareholders to receive cash for their
interests.176 Because the majority enacted and benefitted directly from
these policies, the Delaware Court of Chancery applied Delaware’s wellknown “entire fairness” analysis.177 In its review, the Delaware Supreme
Court agreed with the Delaware Court of Chancery that because the
corporate policies at issue were preferential to the majority, therefore

173. Id. at 564.
174. Id. at 565 (rejecting the argument that Michael had not been denied his
“traditional shareholder rights” and concluding that “a shareholder’s rights in a closely
held corporation may not necessarily be so narrowly defined”).
175. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993).
176. Id. at 1370–73. The specific policies included establishment of an Employee
Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) and the utilization of “key man” life insurance policies.
Id. at 1371–72. The ESOP provided an opportunity for various employees to accrue
retirement benefits, choosing upon retirement to take their interest in the ESOP in the
form of the same Class B stock the minority shareholders owned or cash. Id. at 1371. The
“key man” program included a provision allowing for the use of the life insurance
proceeds to repurchase Class B shares from the employee’s estate. Id. at 1371.
177. Blackwell v. Nixon, No. 9041, 1991 WL 194725, at *5 (Del. Chan. Sept. 26,
1991). The entire fairness test is the standard of review Delaware courts apply to actions
of corporate boards of directors whose members benefit individually and directly from
decisions of that board in the course of its direction of the corporation. See Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (1983).
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making the majority directors interested, entire fairness was the proper
standard of review.178
Turning to the substance of the allegedly oppressive actions, the
Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the entire fairness test had been
met without accepting or rejecting the close corporation analysis of the
Delaware Court of Chancery.179 Once it concluded the challenged
policies were fair in substance, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether it should affirm the Delaware Court of
Chancery’s apparent adoption of Donahue-style minority protections,
or—to put it in the terms of the Meiselman court—expand the view of
the expectations of the minority shareholders beyond the “traditional”
shareholder interests.180 Specifically, the Delaware Supreme Court
analyzed the rationale of the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision,
which it articulated as requiring equality in liquidity, because liquidity is
an ever-present concern in close corporations.181
“It is not difficult to be sympathetic, in the abstract, to a stockholder
who finds himself or herself in that position,” the court began, in a
portion of the opinion titled “No Special Rules for a ‘Closely-Held
Corporation’ Not Qualified as a ‘Close Corporation’ Under Subchapter
XIV of the Delaware General Corporation Law.”182 The Delaware
Supreme Court declined to adopt any form of the Donahue rule for three
reasons. First, it concluded that “[i]t would do violence to normal
corporate practice and our corporation law to fashion an ad hoc ruling
which would result in a court-imposed stockholder buy[]out for which
the parties had not contracted.”183 That is, parties generally are free to—
and therefore should be expected to—contract for minority shareholder
protections, liquidity or otherwise.184 Second, Delaware has a separate
statutory scheme for “close corporations” that counsels against the
judicial creation of a category of non-statutory closely-held
corporations.185 Again, the court observed that parties desiring greater
minority protections in the close corporation context could choose them
in advance when selecting from the menu of statutory default rules.186
Finally, the court expressed confidence that the entire fairness test,
“correctly applied and articulated,” provides the proper approach where

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1375.
Id. at 1377–78.
Id. at 1379–80.
Id. at 1376–77.
Id. at 1379.
Id. at 1380.
Id.
See id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (2017)).
Id. at 1380–81.

440

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:2

it otherwise applies under the general corporation law.187 In sum, the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon reflected the state’s very
strong preference for contracting as the way to conduct intracorporate
affairs.188
In 2014, the Texas Supreme Court joined Delaware’s hands-off,
contractual approach to close corporation shareholder disputes in Ritchie
v. Rupe.189 Prior to Ritchie, the Texas Supreme Court watched silently as
intermediate appellate courts fleshed out an oppression doctrine relying
upon heightened fiduciary duties, Texas’s statutory receivership
provision, and a definition consistent with the reasonable expectations
analysis utilized in a number of states.190 A decision of the Houston
Court of Appeals, Davis v. Sheerin,191 stood as Texas’s primary
oppression case from when it was decided in 1988 to the time of the
Ritchie decision.192 In Davis, the 45 percent shareholder of a corporation
sued the 55 percent shareholders for a panoply of misdeeds, but the
primary allegation involved the 55 percent shareholders’ insistence that
the 45 percent shareholder was not actually a shareholder at all.193 The
court began its analysis by resolving the remedial question of whether a
buyout was the appropriate remedy for the allegedly oppressive acts
found by the jury.194 This question was important because Texas’s
oppression statute did not provide specifically for a buyout; it provided
only for the appointment of a receiver for either rehabilitating the

187. Id. Though the court in Nixon did not rely upon it specifically, commentators
have observed that corporate federalism provides 50 different sets of default rules from
which incorporators can choose. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate
Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 843 (1992)
(“Firms can . . . not only particularize their charters under a state code, but they can also
seek to incorporate in the state whose code best matches their needs—i.e., the state whose
code minimizes their cost of doing business.”); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 6 (1996) (“[S]tates
compete to offer—and managers to use—beneficial sets of legal rules.”). If parties do not
prefer Delaware’s strong legislative and judicial commitment to freedom of contract, they
can choose another state with more robust minority protections.
188. See Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1379–80.
189. Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. 2014).
190. See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Texas Close Corporations:
Majority Rule (Still) Isn’t What It Used To Be, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 33, 34 (2008)
(noting that the Texas Supreme Court had not yet spoken on the matter); see also id. at
40–46 (discussing Texas precedent on both statutory and fiduciary duty developments).
191. Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App. 1988).
192. See Moll, supra note 190, at 34 (describing Davis and the silence of the Texas
Supreme Court).
193. Davis, 754 S.W.2d at 377–78. The majority shareholder’s claim was that the
minority shareholder had gifted his interest to the majority some years earlier. Id. There
also was a supplemental issue regarding a partnership between the majority and minority.
Id.
194. Id. at 378–80.
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corporation or dissolving it.195 Nevertheless, the court found it within the
general equitable powers of Texas courts to fashion an appropriate
remedy, including a buyout.196 Returning to the substantive question of
whether the majority had oppressed the minority, the court concluded
that the majority’s refusal to recognize the minority’s ownership was
uniquely oppressive in its efforts not only to impair, but also to
extinguish entirely, the minority’s expectations of ownership and
participation.197 The court supported its holding with reference to other
states’ precedent interpreting various statutory oppression remedies.198
The Texas Supreme Court declined review of Davis, thus leaving
Texas’s trial and intermediate appellate courts to continue grappling with
close corporation oppression cases. And grapple they did, developing a
veritable stew of doctrine drawing upon statutory oppression remedies
and direct majority-minority fiduciary duties of the Donahue variety.199
The Texas Supreme Court delivered a resounding answer in Ritchie,
concluding that neither the Texas rehabilitative receivership statute nor
common law established the broad oppression doctrine that had been
developed in the intermediate appellate courts.200 Instead, the court
narrowed the definition of “oppression” from actions that harm a
minority shareholder’s reasonable expectations or that depart from a
general standard of fair dealing to the following conjunctive standard:
[D]irectors or managers engage in “oppressive” actions . . . when they
abuse their authority over the corporation with the intent to harm the
interests of one or more of the shareholders, in a manner that does not

195. Id. at 378 (discussing TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 7.05–.06 (West 1980)
(codified at TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 11.404(1)(C), 11.405 (West 2017))).
196. Id. at 380.
197. See id. at 382.
198. Id. at 381–84. Also notable was the court’s decision to organize the misconduct
in two separate parts. In addition to affirming the buyout as the remedy for the oppressive
efforts to deny the minority’s ownership, it also awarded damages for “informal
dividends” the majority paid itself through a profit sharing plan that did not include the
minority and for waste of corporate assets. See id. at 384–85. Of course, siphoning
corporate assets can be a breach of fiduciary duty, but it is notable that the court affirmed
a direct award of damages without further explanation of whether the “informal
dividends” were wrongful as a breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation or as a breach
of a direct duty to the minority. See, e.g., id. As the Ritchie court would later observe, the
relevant Texas statute relaxes the direct-derivative distinction in certain closely-held
corporations. See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.563(c); Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 880–
81.
199. Moll, supra note 190, at 40–50 (collecting cases representing Texas’s minority
oppression doctrine); see also Douglas K. Moll, Majority Shareholder Oppression in
Texas Close Corporations: Majority Rule Isn’t What it Used to Be, 1 HOUST. BUS. & TAX
L.J. 12, 15–18 (2001).
200. Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 877, 891.
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comport with the honest exercise of their business judgment, and by
201
doing so create a serious risk of harm to the corporation.

Critically, the court placed the analysis of oppression under the
statute within the framework of general corporation law, affirmatively
interlinking any definition of oppression with the requirement of harm to
the corporation, and not merely to the minority.202 The court likewise
declined to establish a common law duty not to act oppressively toward
the minority, which it compared to a fiduciary duty to individual
shareholders.203 As the Delaware Supreme Court did in Nixon,204 the
Ritchie court referenced Texas’s existing statutory protections for two
types of non-public corporations, closely-held and close corporations.205
Finally, the court’s preference for contracting was stated as such:
“[a]gain, we note that although [the majority and minority shareholders]
did not enter into a shareholders’ agreement, they certainly could have
done so, and by doing so could have avoided the current dispute.”206
Delaware and Texas remain in the minority in rejecting any
independent doctrine of oppression of a close corporation minority
shareholder.207 While the courts in Ritchie and Nixon expressed a
preference for contracting, both courts also rejected the claim that the
general corporation law was too inflexible to provide adequate remedies
for intracorporate disputes resulting in hardship to minority
shareholders.208 Furthermore, the Ritchie court made an observation not
often discussed in the ongoing debate: the difficulty of developing a
predictable procedural mechanism (direct or derivative action), doctrinal
basis (statutory oppression, common law oppression, or heightened
fiduciary duties), and remedy (dissolution, buyout, or money
damages).209 Though evaluation of close corporation doctrine in its
current form is beyond the scope of this article, the Ritchie court’s
observation is instructive in the crowdfunding context, where more
complication with respect to closeness and exit is layered upon the
existing close entity.210
201. Id. at 871.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 890.
204. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993).
205. Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 880–81.
206. Id. at 881.
207. See Ragazzo, supra note 8, at 1100.
208. Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1381 (“The entire fairness test, correctly applied and
articulated, is the proper judicial approach.”); Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 871 (framing the
interpretation of the oppression statute in terms of business judgment and harm to the
corporation).
209. See Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 889–90, 890 n.60.
210. See infra Section IV.B.
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E. How Close is Close?
Naturally, if courts are inclined to treat close or small, private
corporations differently than large, public corporations, there must be
some analysis for dividing them. The court in Donahue observed that
“[t]here is no single, generally accepted definition” of a close
corporation.211 Should the line be drawn at a certain number of
shareholders?212 Does the nature of family or social relationships in the
founding of the business play a role?213 Is “exit” the primary or
overarching consideration?214 Most courts and commentators have
utilized a definition of close corporation similar to the one announced in
Donahue: “(1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for
the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation
in the management, direction and operations of the corporation.”215
Nonetheless, it is doubtful one could find a corporation with, suppose, 29
shareholders, where all of these shareholders are also shareholderofficer-directors. Likewise, as Professor Moll has observed, disputes
often arise after the shareholder who actively participates in management
dies or gifts the relevant shares, making his or her heirs or donees mere
shareholders.216 Exit remains the most acute issue, given that the
complaining shareholder probably would not complain if he or she could
sell the shares on an open market. But, there are enormous private,
211. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass.
1975).
212. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342(a)(1) (2017) (limiting the number of
shareholders in a statutory close corporation under Delaware law to no more than 30).
While the statutory close corporation and the judge-made doctrine of close corporations
are distinguishable, the statutory limitation is informative. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS.
CODE ANN. § 21.563 (West 2017) (limiting the number of shareholders in a statutory
closely held corporation to fewer than 35).
213. E.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976)
(social connections between co-venturers); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551
(N.C. 1983) (involving a family relationship between a father and his two sons).
214. See generally Means, supra note 115 (proposing that judicial scrutiny of
allegedly oppressive actions be calibrated based on the extent to which the minority
shareholder maintains a voice in corporate affairs).
215. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 511; Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 557–58; see, e.g.,
Douglas Moll, Majority Rule Isn’t What It Used to Be: Shareholder Oppression in Texas
Close Corporations, 63 TEX. B.J. 434, 436 (2000) (discussing this common definition);
see also Thompson, supra note 6, at 372 (contrasting the attributes of close corporations
with public corporations).
216. See Moll, supra note 7, at 961–62, 961 n.249 (discussing unique issues involved
when a shareholder becomes a shareholder by gift or inheritance). Inheritance was also at
issue in Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 583. Donahue’s widow, Euphemia, was the complaining
shareholder and named plaintiff. Id. How could her “reasonable expectations” include
employment, participation in management, and other such matters, when she had never
been employed or participated in management prior to her ownership? See Moll, supra
note 7, at 961–62, 961 n.249.
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illiquid corporations, such as Cargill, Inc., whose web of stock ownership
is believed to comprise over 100 family-member shareholders.217 Most of
these mere shareholders face not only the liquidity problems affecting the
smallest of corporations, but also face voice problems because there are
many more mere shareholders than can possibly be directors.
The ongoing development of oppression doctrine—whether
developed by judges, implemented by legislatures through enactment of
statutory oppression remedies, or both—is premised upon the contrast
between close corporations and public corporations in the context of
intracorporate disputes. In all such cases, courts tend to focus on the
“intimate, illiquid”218 nature of the venture. This dividing line between
the impersonal and liquid view of the public corporation and the intimate
and illiquid version of the close corporation is blurred, if not outright
smashed, by the arrival of crowdfunding. Crowdfunded corporations,
undoubtedly, will be illiquid, but with a much larger number of
shareholders who will invest through the Internet.
F. Blurring Again: The Close-But-Crowdfunded Firm
A corporation utilizing equity crowdfunding transitions overnight
from a close corporation to a corporation with many quasi-public
shareholders. This transition raises the question: does a crowdfunded
close corporation remain a close corporation? Or does equity
crowdfunding result in the corporation becoming “large” or “publiclyheld”? Does “publicly-held” automatically mean that the corporation can
no longer be “close”?
Generally, crowd investors will not expect employment or regular
income from the business, and will not be placing their entire financial
futures in a crowdfunded investment opportunity.219 It also is almost
assured that they will not accumulate a large enough share of the voting
stock to exercise any real power over corporate decision-making. On the
other hand, the vision, role, and direction of the corporation will remain
in the hands of the non-crowd shareholder-officer-directors and they will
still maintain the closeness, blending, and blurring that existed prior to
the arrival of the crowd.
Additionally, neither founding shareholder-officer-directors nor
crowd investors are likely to have real exit opportunities—even if the
217. Gregory Meyer & Neil Hume, Cargill Guards Private Life in 150th Year, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 19, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/ec6f88c2-e4ec-11e4-bb4b-00144feab
7de.
218. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 370.
219. In part, this will be because the crowdfunding regulations place limits on total
investments. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(2) (2017) (setting aggregate investment limits
based upon income or net worth).
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arrangement is less intimate, it remains practically as illiquid as it was
before. The shareholder-officer-directors’ original shares remain as
difficult to sell as they were prior to the raise, and perhaps are not of the
same class or character as the crowd shares.220 Furthermore, there is no
legal or regulatory provision for secondary trading of crowdfunded
shares.221 Along with the uncertain regulatory status of secondary private
sales of crowdfunded shares, the transaction costs of individual-toindividual sales of crowdfunded equity should be expected to be
relatively high—at least as high as the costs to the corporation and the
individual shareholder of replacing a shareholder-officer-director. Even
if some shareholder-officer-directors may have sufficient bargaining
power to negotiate their exit at formation by negotiating the terms of
bylaws, stockholder agreements, and other contractual provisions, crowd
shareholders almost certainly will not.222 This mix of expectations and
limitations on founding shareholder-officer-directors and crowd
shareholders no longer fits neatly into either the mix of expectations and
limitations for public corporations or for close corporations at present.
IV. DISPUTES IN CLOSE-BUT-CROWDFUNDED FIRMS SHOULD BE
TREATED LIKE BIG INVESTOR DISPUTES
A round of crowdfunded investment transforms a small, private
corporation with only shareholder-officer-directors into a corporation
with a small group of shareholder-officer-directors plus a large class of
mere shareholders. Though it is not necessarily as large—by
shareholders or assets—as a traditional publicly traded corporation, its
equity ownership no longer consists of only the founders or people
bonded by family ties or personal relationships—the kinds of people who

220. For example, the shares could be of the non-voting variety. See, e.g., Cleveland
Whiskey, LLC, Amended and Restated Operating Agreement (Exhibit 5 to Form C) 6
(May 19, 2016) (describing Class D units—the crowdfund unit—as non-voting).
221. It is not clear that such a secondary trading platform would even be viable—
how liquid can a market remain if the original “crowd” begins selling their shares? Cf.
Oranburg, supra note 57, at 1. But see Steve O’Hear, Equity Crowdfunding Platform
Seedrs to Launch Secondary Market, TECHCRUNCH (May 7, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/07/equity-crowdfunding-platform-seedrs-to-launchsecondary-market/. Further, it is unclear whether a secondary market would ease exit
concerns the way that public markets do. For example, if a crowd funds a lemon, then a
secondary market simply would result in a crowd-wide death-spiral sell-off that may not
solve the exit problem at all.
222. Nonetheless, public shareholders have almost no bargaining power with respect
to the terms of their stock ownership, and sometimes no voting power. See, e.g.,
Cleveland Whiskey, LLC, Amended and Restated Operating Agreement (Exhibit 5 to
Form C) 6 (May 19, 2016) (describing Class D units—the crowdfund unit—as nonvoting); cf. Snap Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 2, 2017) (describing
public offering of “non-voting” shares).
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generally expect to be shareholders, officers, and directors of the
corporation. Crowd shareholders will certainly appear more like public
shareholders. Nonetheless, their relationships to their crowdfunded
investments could result in a set of expectations that do not fit neatly into
the large, public and small, private corporation paradigm described
above.
This Part begins with a clarification of the choice to make the closebut-crowdfunded model the focus of this article.223 It proceeds to
evaluate the expectations of crowd shareholders within the framework
for public and close corporation shareholders set forth above.224 Much of
the analysis of these issues is woven into a few hypothetical
intracorporate disputes that could arise in crowdfunded ventures, which
illustrate the similarities and differences in expectations.225 Throughout
this Part, it defends this article’s primary claim: that courts deciding
intracorporate disputes in close-but-crowdfunded firms should apply
Delaware’s contract-focused approach instead of the special protections
for non-controlling shareholders contained within many states’
oppression doctrines.226
A. Close-But-Crowdfunded as a Significant Slice of Equity
Crowdfunding Activity
Professor Seth C. Oranburg aptly observed that crowdfunding could
fill a funding gap in the startup life cycle between the initial investment
stage and the stage at which startups attract more substantial investment
from angel investors and venture capital funds.227 The life cycle he
describes involves heavy early-stage spending designed to build out a
foundation for substantial later growth and long-term profitability; in
contrast, he notes that small businesses, such as bike shops or food
trucks, are expected to grow slowly.228 Undoubtedly, the high-tech feel
of purchasing shares of stock through Internet portals associates
crowdfunding with fast-growing, capital-burning tech startups.
Nonetheless, an outsized number of the first 50 crowdfund offerings
represent permanently small enterprises, such as craft alcohol companies,
many of them offering some form of current or future equity interest.229
One explanation is that there is some degree of irrational exuberance or
223. See infra Section IV.A.
224. See infra Section IV.B.
225. See infra Section IV.C.
226. See infra Section IV.A.–C.
227. Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 419–22.
228. Id. at 406. Professor Oranburg also notes that small businesses typically are bad
equity investments. Id.
229. See Leaf et al., supra note 35.
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naiveté involved with crowdfunding—unsophisticated consumerinvestors are merely investing in a lot of lemons whose founders turned
to crowdfunding as a last resort.230 Indeed, as Professor Darian M.
Ibrahim notes, the unaccredited crowd associated with Title III
crowdfunding is a bit of an enigma.231 On the one hand, the crowd could
have specialized knowledge drawn from participation in a community of
common interest—Professor Ibrahim provides the useful example of a
crowd of video gamers possessing better information about the viability
of a video game than angel investors who are not video gamers
themselves.232 On the other hand, as best described by Professor Joan M.
Heminway, crowds can be irrational and therefore may be expected to
make unwise investment decisions.233 For the purposes of this article, it
is irrelevant whether the crowd irrationally chases lemons or reveals
actual wisdom through investing money. However crowd shareholders
arrive at their investing decisions, when they choose to invest in a closebut-crowdfunded venture, they become a mere shareholder in a
previously very close enterprise.
The clearest example of the close-but-crowdfunded venture may be
a local craft beer brewery or other local artisanal food or beverage
company. Crowd investment in a local craft brewery ties together affinity
for the beer itself, the community of local beer enthusiasts,234 and
perhaps a general affinity for local business. Craft beer brewing, much
like running a restaurant, bike shop, food truck, or some other local
business, is a small business activity. Founders of a craft beer brewery
likely are shareholder-officer-directors and are probably bonded by
friendship or family relationships. Prior to raising capital through
crowdfunding, this type of venture would implicate existing close
corporation doctrine. A company using crowdfunding in the manner
proposed by Professor Oranburg may begin as a small corporation, but
likely has no intention of staying that way.235 The expectations and
motivations of crowd shareholders in permanently small, close-butcrowdfunded corporations add an additional layer of complexity to the
230. See generally Ibrahim, supra note 25.
231. Id. at 597.
232. Id.
233. Id. (citing Joan MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the
Crowdfunding Era: Disclosing to and for the “Crowd”, 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 829–30
(2014)).
234. Such an affinity apparently has existed for some time. According to a 2017
report, London’s “Golden Lane Genuine Beer Brewery” raised the equivalent of £19
million in 1805 from 600 “co-partners.” See MARTIN CORNELL, OFF3R, CROWDFUNDING
TAPS BEER DRINKERS’ ENTHUSIASM: A REPORT ON CROWDFUNDING AND BREWERIES 2,
https://learn.off3r.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Crowdfunding-taps-beer-beerdrinkers-enthusiasm-1.pdf.
235. See Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 405–06.
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existing close corporation doctrine. As described below, this complexity
counsels against its application.
B. Fitting in with the Crowd
At first blush, crowd shareholders appear much closer to large,
public shareholders than to close corporation shareholders. Their shares
come with no expectation of management positions or a directorship.
There is no expectation of employment, and, in light of individual
investment limits and offering size limits, it is doubtful any crowd
shareholder will find himself or herself as having invested substantial life
savings in a venture. The crowdfunded shares likely will have many
default features of other public common stock.236 Even so, crowd
shareholders do not have the same exit opportunities as public
shareholders in widely traded corporations. These features of the
relationship of the crowd shareholder with the crowdfunded corporation
diverge from the features of the big investor, big firm relationship and
the small shareholder-officer-director, small firm relationship, even
before the unique features of crowdfunding come into focus.
Adding to the combination of lower traditional expectations and
minimal exit opportunities is the potentially unique set of expectations
that arise in the crowdfunding context. These expectations flow from
three identifiable themes in the burgeoning field of financial technology
and technological innovation in the delivery of various services. First,
many forms of crowdfunding, as described earlier in this Part, involve a
substantial affinity for the product or service or the people promoting the
campaign.237 This is especially true in donative crowdfunding, where the
crowdfunder provides money in exchange for mere trinkets or because of
a desire to purchase some yet-unfunded product.238 This affinity for the
product or company is less likely to motivate investors in large, public
corporations. For example, it seems doubtful that some significant subset
of investors in the common stock of the Coca-Cola Company owns the
stock merely because they enjoy drinking the beverage.239 Needless to
236. This is not guaranteed, however, given the heterogeneous expectations across
crowd investors and crowdfunded firms. See Verret, supra note 37, at 930–31.
237. See, e.g., GREEN BAY PACKERS, INC., supra note 73.
238. See, e.g., Oculus Rift: Step Into the Game, KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1523379957/oculus-rift-step-into-the-game
(last
visited Oct. 9, 2017) (describing an offering of posters, t-shirts, and prototypes depending
on the amount of money donated).
239. On the other hand, technology offerings such as SNAP, Inc. (the corporation
that owns and operates the popular Snapchat mobile application) attracted significant
investment despite having unique governance features—its IPO offered only non-voting
shares, yet still traded at prices substantially above the IPO price of $17 for months
following the offering. See Snap Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 2, 2017)
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say, they do not need to invest in Coca-Cola to consume Coca-Cola
products, in the way that Marillion’s United States fan base needed to
donate to a fund to see their favorite rock band live without traveling
overseas.240 The local fans of a craft beer brewery may need to invest in
their local brewer to ensure they continue enjoying their favorite local
beverage. The local (and non-local) fans of the Green Bay Packers at one
time needed to invest in the club either to ensure it remained in Green
Bay or simply to own a piece of their favorite club.241
Second, many emerging technology-based companies, such as
Uber, rely on a social network effect to generate a community around the
product or service.242 The communities that emerge around these
technologies ultimately come to shape the product or service itself.
Community members may not join the community specifically to
participate in the development of the product or service, but the nature of
technology-based companies is to leverage the size and scope of the user
community to fine-tune the deployment of the product or service.243
Similarly, early investors from the community of common interest often
can become ambassadors or evangelists for the brand or product.244
Crowd investors, making their investments through web-based portals,
likely could behave similarly to the community of users. Furthermore,
technology companies are among those more likely to choose
crowdfunding as a source of capital.245 Similarly, but on a much smaller
scale, in the close-but-crowdfunded brewery, crowdfunders may play an
active, if informal, role in in the development and execution of new
varieties of beer.
Third, the nature of close-but-crowdfunded entities suggests they
will tap into a localized version of affinity and community. Doing so
could result in disparate crowd shareholder expectations about the
(describing sale of “non-voting” shares); see also SNAP Inc. Class A Common Stock
Historical Stock Prices, NASDAQ (http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/snap/historical) (last
visited Dec. 22, 2017).
240. See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
241. See GREEN BAY PACKERS, INC., supra note 73, at ii.
242. See Byrne Hobart, The Uber of X Will Be Uber, MEDIUM (Mar. 5, 2017),
http://bit.ly/2yDPIwm. This feature of crowdfunding may not be as prevalent in the closebut-crowdfunded context. Building a network from which insight and scalability can be
monetized is a feature of the fast-growing startup Professor Oranburg describes. See
Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 406 (discussing the capital-intensive nature of
building a “two-sided” market and using Facebook as an example); see also Kellen Zale,
When Everything is Small: The Regulatory Challenge of Scale in the Sharing Economy,
53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 949, 979–83 (2016) (describing the importance of network effects
in the sharing economy).
243. See generally Hobart, supra note 242.
244. See Mitchell Hartman, Crowdfund My Startup, Please!, MARKETPLACE (May
16, 2016, 4:04 PM), http://bit.ly/2hUnVzZ.
245. See generally Leaf et al., supra note 35.
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operation of the venture, and is most likely to involve the importation of
crowd shareholders to the smallest group of shareholder-officerdirectors. Shareholder expectations could include the belief that the
business will provide some tangible benefit to the community or conduct
business in a certain manner. It may even include the expectation that the
company will remain small and local. If some change in circumstances
results in a change in the way these businesses operate, crowd
shareholder expectations could be blunted, and, as the corporation
remains close, there would be no meaningful exit. Drawing upon these
three themes, the following sections illustrate some of the potential
intracorporate disputes in crowdfunded ventures and the diversity of
governance issues that may percolate within the ventures.246
C. Intracorporate Dispute Vignettes
1. The Founders’ Quarrel
The first potential source of intracorporate dispute in crowdfunded
ventures is the traditional one. Let us return to the discussion of the local
artisanal burger joint. Suppose, instead of The Burger Joint proceeding
indefinitely as a close corporation with A, B, and C as shareholderofficer-directors, the three founders decide to crowdfund The Burger
Joint in the local community pursuant to their state crowdfunding
exemption. The Burger Joint issues shares worth 10 percent of the equity
and voting power in the corporation, while A, B, and C each retain 30
percent of the equity and voting power. After inviting their new
shareholder-only crowd investors to a “shareholders’ meeting”—no
doubt featuring a lot of hamburgers—A, B, and C retire to the back office
of the restaurant to bask in the glow of their successful capital raise. A
and B, much to C’s chagrin, begin discussing riding the wave of
momentum of the crowdfunding campaign to expand the business,
perhaps through franchising. C demurs, citing her lack of interest in the
idea, as well as her belief that the energy of the crowd derives from The
Burger Joint’s localness, as well as its quality hamburgers. As it did
before, the rift between A, B, and C festers and grows, until A and B
decide that the only option is to terminate C’s employment and position
as an officer with the corporation. Shortly thereafter, at the next annual
meeting, A and B vote their shares to elect only themselves to the board
of directors, thus ending C’s tenure as a director of The Burger Joint. The
Burger Joint, of course, has never paid a dividend to its shareholders,
246. As Professor Verret observed, crowdfunding illustrates the substantial need for
governance flexibility, as firms have varying governance needs. See Verret, supra note
37, at 938–41.
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and, like many small corporations, distributes returns to its shareholders
through salaries and benefits to shareholder-officer-directors.247
Co-founder C, now unceremoniously removed from her
employment and directorship, watches her substantial financial interest
in the corporation evaporate. Certainly, her investment in the venture has
value, but she is locked out of realizing any of the return without her
salary. Suppose C seeks redress through a lawsuit against A, B, and The
Burger Joint. The animating theory of her suit would be that A and B
caused The Burger Joint to terminate her and remove her from the board
in contravention of her reasonable expectation of continued
employment.248 In the absence of a clear statement in The Burger Joint’s
bylaws or a stockholder agreement, a court would have two options:
follow existing oppression precedent and analyze C’s reasonable
expectations in light of the course of her dealings with A and B to this
point, or follow Delaware and decide the case on whether the action was
fair in its entirety or made with sound business judgment. The
fundamental disagreement between the views expressed by the court in
Meiselman and the court in Nixon is over the practicability of pre-dispute
contracting. The court in Meiselman observed that the nature of close
corporations was such that most minority shareholders would not have
the bargaining power or inclination to pursue robust contractual minority
protections.249 The court in Nixon relied upon the extensive menu of
permissible contractual tools available under the law when it declined to
“fashion an ad hoc ruling which would result in a court-imposed
stockholder buy[]out for which the parties had not contracted.”250 The
decision to crowdfund, at minimum, creates a new opportunity to
consider potential contractual options for the relationship between and
among the founders and the crowd. This new opportunity to contract
substantially undermines the justification for fashioning a broad remedy
that the parties did not make explicit through contracting or the offering
process. If the court chooses the latter option, several harms can result.
For example, if the court orders that the corporation reemploy C, it
will have to bear the cost of reemploying a dissident officer.251 Even if
damages or a forced buyout were ordered against A and B individually
247. Cf. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 660–61 (Mass.
1976) (describing shareholder-officer-directors’ salaries and the later cancellation of the
salary paid to the plaintiff-shareholder).
248. Such a theory could proceed either as a claim for breach of heightened fiduciary
duties or oppression, or both, depending on the state. See supra Section III.C.1.
249. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558–59 (N.C. 1983).
250. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993).
251. Front pay or back pay may also be a form of relief. Cf. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at
664–65 (ordering back pay jointly and severally against the majority stockholders, but
permitting corporate assets to be “diverted” if appropriate).
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(that is, not against The Burger Joint), the substantial alteration of A and
B’s individual finances could impair their ability to infuse further capital
into the business. Dissolution would be an equal if not greater harm—the
crowd shareholders’ hopes of a return on their investment would
evaporate into liquidation along with the interests of the founding
investors. One potential argument supporting oppression doctrine is that
granting a minority shareholder remedies against the majority will cause
harm only to the majority whose direct oppressive acts caused harm to
the minority. In a crowdfunded venture, the crowd, like any group of
public shareholders, is innocent of any transgression committed by the
majority or minority founders against one another. Therefore, given the
absence of a substantial justification for the court to make inferences
about C’s reasonable expectations or about the decision not to provide
for minority protections in their corporate documents, the harm that
could befall The Burger Joint if a court applied existing oppression
doctrine counsels following Delaware’s approach.
2. The Locked-in Crowd
Consider a startup company designing a new household product, for
example, some typical better mousetrap that one might see on an episode
of ABC’s Shark Tank.252 When the forlorn founders walk off of the set
with no shark investment, they turn to the crowd. Following a
reasonably, but not overwhelmingly, successful raise, the founders have
sold 15 percent of the business and raised around $100,000—more than
enough to fill existing orders, do a bit more marketing, and increase the
sales footprint for the product. Ultimately, however, the business never
fully takes off, and the founders begin to allow the business to wither
slowly. The crowd takes notice, but their 15 percent entitles them to no
meaningful voting power and no ability to confront the withering
strategy. Perhaps the founders even draw down the remaining corporate
assets through the maintenance of their managerial salaries, even as sales
decline and the business meanders toward inactivity. In the process, the
crowd simply requests that the founders buy them out—that seems fair,
after all.253 The founders, acting as directors, deny the request. Though
not frozen out of employment or their life savings, the crowd likely has
252. Shark Tank is a television program that consists of a panel of famous business
experts hearing business pitches from small entrepreneurs. See generally About Shark
Tank TV Show Series, ABC, http://abc.tv/1pqEUEb (last visited Oct. 22, 2017). The
experts, called “sharks,” decide whether and how to invest their own money in the
businesses, and often provide feedback on the entrepreneurs’ pitches and business ideas.
Id.
253. For example, Professor Moll proposes a default buyout as a check against
opportunism by the majority. See Moll, supra note 7, at 900.
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been frozen out of their initial investment, and may never see any return.
At least in part, this freezeout derives from the founders’ otherwise
formally permissible decisions to continue with payment of managerial
salaries and to not expend any additional corporate resources toward
growing the business. Like any other minority shareholder, the crowd is
powerless to stop the majority shareholder-officer-directors and is denied
the opportunity to liquidate in any meaningful way. Because exit and
liquidity comprise an important part of the basis of oppression doctrine,
crowd shareholders have a non-frivolous argument that the founders
breached heightened fiduciary duties or otherwise oppressed them.
If the crowd shareholders sue the founders alleging oppression, the
argument likely would consist of the factual argument that the
shareholder-officer-directors provided themselves liquidity from their
investment in the corporation by paying themselves salaries, while
excluding the crowd from any liquidity. The litigation likely would turn
on whether the crowd had any reasonable expectation of liquidity. Of
course, the crowd could lose merely because, as described throughout
this article and in others, crowd shareholders should not expect many
crowdfund investments to provide substantial, much less liquid,
returns.254 But if the court awarded a buyout or dissolution, the founding
shareholder-officer-directors would be personally liable for a substantial
financial award to the crowd shareholders.
The risk of potential personal liability for otherwise corporate
actions may be defensible in the context of a close corporation, where the
expectations of the small number of shareholder-officer-directors are
discernable and the causal link between the breach and the harm is clear.
As noted, the crowd is a group of individuals with potentially widely
different expectations. Thus, the proof of the causal link between the
shareholder-officer-directors continuing to pay themselves salaries while
the corporation withered is more tenuous as applied to the crowd. Yet
again, the crowdfunding process created a new opportunity for the
parties to set the terms of their relationship. If a “crowd buyout” was
contemplated, it could be created within the framework of the offering—
in the same way that future equity interests are being developed for
crowdfunded ventures at present.

254. See supra note 219 and accompanying text; see also Oranburg, Bridgefunding,
supra note 23, at 406 (describing equity investments in small businesses as questionable).
See generally Ibrahim, supra note 25 (discussing the potential for a market for “lemons”
which would result in irrational or poor investments); Heminway, supra note 233, 829–
30.
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3. The Loyal Employee
The first two vignettes set the founders against one another and
against the crowd as a whole. Another possibility is that the founders
could find themselves at odds with an individual shareholder from the
crowd. Employment or managerial responsibility for the business is an
ever-present theme in close corporation intracorporate disputes.255 Like
in Wilkes, the typical case involves a dispute where most or all of the
shareholders hold management responsibility or employment with the
venture.256 Though this article has proceeded on the recognition that
crowd shareholders typically will not expect employment with the
venture, it is conceivable that employees could become crowd
shareholders. Consider a venture with a class of crowdfunded shares that
are not fully subscribed. As a holiday bonus, the principal shareholderofficer-directors issue crowdfunded shares to a few loyal employees who
are not officers. With employees mixed into the crowd, an employment
dispute could become intertwined with the relationship between the
founders and the crowd. Specifically, an employee-crowd shareholder
who is terminated or otherwise leaves her employment may find herself
with an asset she valued only as a part of her employment with the
venture.
The development of oppression doctrine often drew upon the
employment expectations of minority shareholder-officer-directors and
the relationship between the ownership of the stock and the position
within the business. A terminated employee-crowd shareholder may
come to believe that ownership of the stock is worthless if it is not
connected to employment in the venture.257 For the purposes of this
255. See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 657, 659–60 (describing the management and
directorship responsibilities of the four co-venturers).
256. See id.
257. See generally Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311 (N.Y. 1989)
(providing a classic example of how employment, stock ownership, and financial
participation in a business intertwine). In Ingle, a minority shareholder-officer-director
purchased his shares subject to a stockholder agreement wherein the controlling parties
(the business’s original sole founder and his sons) could repurchase his shares if the
minority shareholder-officer-director “cease[d] to be an employee.” Id. at 1312. The
controlling parties later terminated his employment and exercised the right to purchase
the shares. Id. Though the plaintiff in Ingle pled the case as a wrongful termination, the
driving force of his argument was that his status as a non-controlling close corporation
shareholder prohibited his termination because it resulted in his being deprived of his
ownership and role in managing the business. Id. at 1312–13. Though the majority of the
court ultimately denied relief, id. at 1314, the dissent made a persuasive case that some
equitable remedy was appropriate to protect “expectancies” generated through his role as
a “coprincipal” in the business. Id. at 1317. The plaintiff in Ingle did not challenge the
buyout price, but the dissent suggested it was low under the circumstances, also
implicating the possibility that the plaintiff expected the value in his investment to be
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vignette, assume also that the corporation maintains key-employee life
insurance policies for certain levels of management, such that if a key
manager is discharged from employment, the corporation can utilize the
policy to buy back the shares from the manager’s estate.258
In a suit by the loyal employee against the founding majority, the
argument likely would proceed as a claim that the ownership of the
shares came with an expectation of employment, as well as an allegation
that one class of employee-shareholders (the key employees) receives
liquidity upon separation, while the crowd shareholder class of
employee-shareholders does not. Such would not be the case, of course,
with the average crowd shareholder in the venture, but it would be the
case of the loyal employee who received the crowdfund-share holiday
bonus. The employee likely would lose if the court perceived the
employee’s proffered expectation of continued employment as based
solely on share ownership.259 Nonetheless, the employee could make a
more nuanced argument—that the share ownership was a benefit of or
compensation for employment that is worthless without the continued
employment relationship. Likewise, a court may be tempted, in balancing
the equities, to order the majority shareholders to buy out this single
shareholder, the cost of which is much smaller than compelling the
buyout of the entire crowd or the holder of a founder’s share of stock in
the corporation. A court may be even less hesitant to do so where the
corporation provides liquidity to one class of employees as a benefit to
those in control and not to the other class.
Similar to the prior vignettes, the mechanics of the crowdfunding
process significantly weaken the justifications for taking an equitable
approach instead of a contractual one: the parties can agree on whether
and how liquidity will be made available and expectations of
employment, stock ownership, and participation can be calibrated in
express terms.260 Furthermore, even a small buyout would be harmful to
through employment compensation rather than capital appreciation, dividends, or a later
acquisition. Id. at 1316 n.1.
258. Cf. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1370–72 (Del. 1993). Such a predispute arrangement is common in smaller corporations, not only for discharge or
voluntary separation from serving as an officer, but also for the death of the key
managerial employee. Id.
259. Cf. Ingle, 535 N.E.2d at 1313 (concluding that a position as a close corporation
non-controlling shareholder does not abrogate employee-shareholder’s employment atwill).
260. For example, a number of technology companies, most notably Skype, grant
equity purchase options as compensation under strict exercise and repurchase provisions,
even to the point of reserving themselves the right to repurchase any equity shares
purchased by the employee pursuant to the options. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Skype
Not Alone When It Comes to Options, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 6, 2011, 1:03 PM),
http://nyti.ms/2qvDKAB (describing a number of companies’ specific option programs).
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the close-but-crowdfunded corporation, despite the fact that it might not
be as drastic as dissolution or as costly as the buyout of a founder’s
share. As discussed previously, the major benefit of crowdfunding is the
extent to which it can be used to open capital flows to small
businesses.261 Judicial interference in the growth and development of the
practice by imposing stricter standards of conduct on majority
shareholders or applying statutory remedies expansively, as it would in
the other vignettes, impairs crowdfunding’s potential. Further, such a
rule would limit unnecessarily the ability of corporations and employees
to reap the benefits of employee stock ownership.262
4. The Early Adopter
The “Early Adopter” is a savvy consumer who perceived value in a
product or service in its early stages, perhaps prior to its existence in
physical form.263 A useful real-life example is the tale of the company
Oculus and its virtual reality headset, the Rift, which raised $2.4 million
on Kickstarter for development and production costs.264 After two quick
rounds of venture capital (“V.C.”) investment of $16 and $75 million,
Facebook purchased the fledgling company for $2 billion.265 Suppose
that instead of the promise of a prototype, the Kickstarter “investors” had
received equity amounting to ten percent of the company—a valuation of
approximately $25 million. Accounting (quite roughly) for the dilution
associated with the additional $90 million of the V.C. rounds, a $2
billion sale to Facebook would have resulted in a valuation of $50
million for the crowd investors.
Many Oculus Rift crowdfunders felt they missed out on the deal of
a lifetime, for quite obvious reasons.266 This disappointment suggests
there could be some expectation of loyalty to early adopters or “fans” in
crowdfunded ventures. But was the source of this anger so obvious? The
loss of a piece of the financial return received by the founder was
upsetting, but there was no reason to believe donating to a Kickstarter
261. See generally supra Section II.B.
262. For a general discussion of the potential benefits of non-managerial employee
stock ownership, see Xin Chang et al., Non-Executive Employee Stock Options and
Corporate Innovation, 115 J. FIN. ECON. 168 (2015).
263. See Christian Catalini & Catherine Tucker, Seeding the S-Curve? The Role of
Early Adopters in Diffusion 3 (NET Institute Working Paper, No. 16-02, 2016) (defining
“early adopter” and discussing how technology companies may use a waitlist to identify
them).
264. For a thorough account of the tale of Oculus Rift, see Chaboud, supra note 50,
86–90.
265. Id. at 87–88.
266. See, e.g., Joel Johnson, Oculus Grift: Kickstarter as Charity for Venture
Capitalists, VALLEYWAG (Mar. 26, 2014, 8:46 AM), http://bit.ly/1ePlt6Y.
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campaign would entitle the funders to any part of the massive transaction
proceeds. Arguably, there was some combination of expectations that
included more than money—some belief that Oculus Rift was supposed
to stay small or true to some undefined values.267 At the outset, when
Oculus was merely a startup in its founder’s garage, crowdfunders
participated in the Kickstarter campaign hoping the company would
succeed and mass-produce its innovative new technology, which the
crowdfunders would then consume.268 They expected only to receive the
product itself and perhaps engage with a community of like-minded
enthusiasts.269 The expectation appeared to change dramatically once the
small startup transformed into a multi-billion-dollar asset of one of the
world’s largest technology corporations. Clearly, the view of the public
corporation with shareholders motivated only by financial returns is
inapplicable, and the view of the close corporation as a partnership
would not be particularly helpful in explaining, much less resolving, the
difficulty of the Oculus Rift scenario.
A future company that follows a similar path to success in the way
that Oculus did with the Rift could be an equity crowdfunded venture. As
Professor Oranburg observed, crowdfunding could be a source of “gap”
funding between the early rounds of friends-and-family equity
investment and the first major round of V.C. investment.270 For the
purposes of this vignette, let us assume that a small technology
corporation conducts a crowdfund offering to raise funds within the
traditional V.C. gap.271 The expectation of the founders, of course, is that
the crowdfund raise will provide Professor Oranburg’s bridge between
the friends-and-family round and the first real attention from V.C.
funding. For that reason, the crowdfunding raise is very small as a
percentage of the outstanding equity—perhaps only five percent of the
total equity is sold for $1 million. After all, the founders did not want a
cluttered capitalization table when the V.C. funding attention finally
arose.
As with Oculus Rift, however, this corporation flies past any multiround, multi-year V.C. and private equity funding pattern. Rather,
another Facebook offers to pluck it from relative obscurity for $1 billion.
The crowd’s portion of the sale proceeds is, of course, substantial. Five
percent of $1 billion is $50 million, a 5,000 percent gain.
267. See Chaboud, supra note 50, at 88–89.
268. See Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29
J. BUS. VENTURING 1, 3 (2014) (discussing the goals of funders of non-equity
crowdfunding projects).
269. See id.
270. Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 401–02.
271. See id.
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In contrast to the other vignettes, litigation over a 50-fold increase
in the value of one’s investment seems unthinkable. But is it less
unusual, in light of the existing corporation law, that mere donors to
Oculus Rift felt that they were subject to some unfairness? This vignette
is less useful to illustrate how courts could decide a specific dispute
within a close-but-crowdfunded entity. Nonetheless, the possibility of
litigation or other impairment to goodwill in Oculus Rift’s situation—
where crowdfunders received no equity and could not have had any
reasonable expectation of sharing in the proceeds from the Facebook
acquisition—illustrates the heterogeneous expectations that may drive
tensions in close-but-crowdfunded corporations. In fact, such tensions
may be more prevalent in close-but-crowdfunded ventures than in soonto-be large ones such as Oculus.
As Professor J.W. Verret observed, ownership features of
crowdfunded corporations illustrate the potential demand for creative
governance solutions and the emergence of them outside of the
traditional securities law framework.272 The Early Adopter vignette,
while unlikely to result in a traditional close corporation imbroglio over
shareholder-to-shareholder duties or equitable remedies, illustrates the
ways that crowdfunding can result in a demand for creative solutions to
crowdfunding-specific governance issues.273 The demand for creative
solutions is supplied by development and experimentation with
contractual terms and structures that can be deployed based on the
individual needs of each potentially-crowdfunded business. The closebut-crowdfunded firm, then, is at the heart of Professor Thompson’s
question of how to allocate the solutions structure between contracting
and judges.274
The major tensions in the tale of Oculus Rift are not only that the
early adopters lost out on major financial returns, but also felt a sense of
loss when the company abandoned its smallness.275 Equity crowdfunding
by itself may be the initial solution, but how should a close-butcrowdfunded firm with a group of early adopters manage the
uncomfortable tension between their enthusiasm for the product or
people and the ever-present financial aspect? Perhaps a more apt
question would be: what happens when the local craft brewery decides to

272. Verret, supra note 37, at 936–48.
273. Cf. id.
274. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 403.
275. See Chaboud, supra note 50, at 89 (noting that more than 80% of the comments
left on the Kickstarter page were negative with respect to the Facebook deal).
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sell to an international conglomerate such as Anheuser-Busch InBev?276
The first option, utilized in many technology corporations, is to establish
non-voting or diluted-voting shares.277 In such a scenario, the founders
maintain control over the venture, but still offer early adopters a greater
financial stake. Another option is to issue crowdfunded shares in a
convertible form—that is, the shares represent the above-discussed five
percent of the corporation’s equity as long as the corporation remains
close-but-crowdfunded or in the V.C. gap portion of its life cycle. But, if
Facebook offers an extraordinary amount for the corporation, the shares
can be converted to a larger financial stake. In contrast, many close-butcrowdfunded ventures with no intention of becoming large might
actually sell crowdfunded shares that provide more substantial voting
rights. Thus, if InBev wants to buy the craft brewing company, the deal
might involve having to address the non-financial desires of the crowd.
Any of these contractual arrangements between founders and the crowd
can mitigate and allocate the tension between founders and the crowd in
an Oculus Rift-style scenario. Thus, this vignette illustrates the
superiority of contracting for the purposes of expanding the universe of
capital for entrepreneurs. In the age of capital markets innovation,
freedom to organize firms in creative new ways is ultimately more
desirable.
D. Resolving the Tension: Small Crowd Shareholders as Big
Investors
The heterogeneous expectations and motivations of crowd
shareholders illustrated above make crowd shareholders unique from an
equity investment perspective. Crowd shareholders do not fit neatly into
the mold of the close corporation owner, whose stake in a company may
be derived from personal involvement in the business or a personal
relationship with its founders. While some crowd investors undoubtedly
will invest solely with investment returns in mind, there is reason to
doubt this expectation will be the primary motivation in all crowdfunded
investments.278 As described above, crowdfunded ventures inherently
face massive risk of failure and a relatively long horizon to any payoff
from an equity investment.279 Such equity is not a great candidate for
276. See, e.g., Ronnie Crocker, Karbach to be Acquired by Anheuser-Busch InBev,
THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Nov. 3, 2016, 1:57 PM) http://www.chron.com/business/
retail/article/Karbach-to-be-acquired-by-Anheuser-BuschInBev-10590579.php
277. Cf. Snap Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 3 (Feb. 2, 2017) (describing
sale of “non-voting” shares).
278. See supra Section IV.C.4 (discussing the non-pecuniary influences in the
Oculus Rift saga).
279. See supra Section III.F.
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many returns-focused investors, as the shares likely will not resemble
robust, tradable, growth, or dividend-paying public equities that would
attract such investors. Given the lack of a secondary market, they are
unlikely to attract speculators looking to open and close positions
quickly.
As illustrated above, the close-but-crowdfunded Burger Joint, or
some other craft food and beverage concept, may be the quintessential
crowdfunded venture.280 Such corporations, once crowdfunded, will
retain numerous features prevalent in close corporations. Investors in
these ventures are not venture capitalists searching for the next unicorn,
but perhaps are investing for personal aesthetics, as do many Packers
fans. With this volatile mix of expectations, closeness, and lack of exit,
existing oppression doctrine may become a theory upon which
intracorporate litigation can emerge. Nonetheless, it is even more
difficult to apply than usual,281 not to mention less justified.
Courts faced with oppression claims from minority shareholders in
close-but-crowdfunded ventures without determinative provisions in the
charter, bylaws, or stockholder agreement have two options to avoid
“untempered application”282 of oppression doctrine in the crowdfunded
venture. First, a court could conclude that the entity is no longer close
and require the complaining minority shareholder to assert a claim that
could be brought by a public shareholder for director self-dealing or lack
of care.283 This option may be the best for the frozen-out founder or the
employee. In such a claim, simply articulating a reasonable expectation
of employment along with stock ownership should be insufficient—that
is, the act of the directors must be shown to be harmful, unjustified selfdealing, or demonstrating a lack of care that causes more harm to the
corporation than would providing a remedy.
Second, even if a court wishes to identify the close-butcrowdfunded corporation as one subject to oppression doctrine, it should
greatly circumscribe the range of reasonableness within the reasonable
expectations analysis. With a very small number of shareholder-officer280. See Leaf et al., supra note 35 (observing that 8 of the first 50 crowdfund
offerings were in the alcoholic beverage industry).
281. As the Ritchie court observed, oppression doctrine is a bit difficult to apply in a
consistent and certain manner. See Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 889, 890 n.60 (Tex.
2014).
282. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass.
1976).
283. Cf. Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 871 (requiring the minority to prove that the majority
abused its business judgment in a manner that harmed the corporation); Nixon v.
Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1375–76 (Del. 1993) (applying the entire fairness analysis
where the corporation established an ESOP for certain controlling employee-shareholders
and not the minority non-employee shareholders). This could also implicate the question
of whether such a claim could be direct or derivative.
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directors, a court’s ability to recreate and evaluate an individual
investor’s expectations is defensible, if debatable. Furthermore, in these
cases, the court can fashion a remedy in a less restrictive manner. Such
an approach would not be possible with a group of crowd shareholders
with diverging expectations about their investment and the company in
which they invested. Articulating any version of a reasonable expectation
of a crowd shareholder outside the view of the ordinary public
shareholder would serve to frustrate the most valuable purpose of
crowdfunding: opening channels for new capital for the formation and
expansion of small businesses. Likewise, articulating a reasonable
expectation of a founding shareholder-officer-director—perhaps one who
voted against crowdfunding altogether—is fraught with the risk of
damaging the crowdfunded firm. Finally, while a substantive evaluation
of oppression doctrine in its current form is beyond the scope of this
article, it is enough to say that the concerns that the court in Ritchie
articulated are even more acute in the crowdfunding context, where
identifying and evaluating the determinative facts about the relationship
between and among the founders and the crowd is even more
complicated than in a corporation with only three or four players.284
To be sure, as it has been throughout the life of oppression doctrine,
some wrongs may be left without a remedy. But, overall, discovering the
full potential of crowdfunding as an investment mechanism should result
in gains that are worth this cost.
V. CONCLUSION
Equity crowdfunding is just one part of a larger trend of
experimentation and disruption brought about by technological
innovation in the financial space. New technologies are driving new
modes of finance for businesses of all shapes and sizes at a feverish pace
across the United States and the world. This article represents an early
effort at addressing the myriad of corporate governance issues that likely
will percolate through courts as crowdfunded ventures become more
common.
One likely place to find tension from the emergence of equity
crowdfunding is in the relatively small corporation with relatively few
founding shareholders—some or all of which may also be directors,
officers, and employees. Courts in many jurisdictions provide special
protections to non-controlling shareholders in close corporations to
shield them from the harsh outcomes of many intracorporate disputes.
Two primary justifications underlie these doctrines. First, history and the
284. See Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 889, 890 n.60 (noting the difficulty in applying
oppression doctrine even within its traditional context); supra Section IV.C & D.
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experience of small business disputes suggest that personal or family
relationships among the principal actors in a business often result in
minority shareholders relying on trust instead of explicit contractual
protections, not to mention forgoing the expense of hiring lawyers to
negotiate such protections during the business’s planning phase. Second,
in the absence of such contracting and the sophistication it suggests,
courts can fairly infer that a minority shareholder has reasonable, but not
contracted for, expectations of financial or managerial participation in
the business based upon the course of the parties’ dealings with one
another, and that it is appropriate for courts to give those expectations
effect through its equitable powers.
Once such a small business uses equity crowdfunding, the
justifications for these protections become questionable. First, the
mechanics of the crowdfunding process create both the incentive and
opportunity for the founders to contract for whatever terms they believe
best protect themselves and their business, and to decide upon what
terms they will offer equity to the crowd. Second, and similarly, the
crowdfunding process undermines the inference that there are unwritten,
yet reasonable, expectations about any shareholder’s role in the venture.
Moreover, the heterogeneous and sometimes contradictory expectations
crowd shareholders may have regarding their participation in the venture
can further cloud the question of whether any given set of shareholder
expectations is reasonable. In combination with the lack of exit or voice
already prevalent in close corporations, similar iniquities in close-butcrowdfunded firms might lead to judicial skepticism of the sort that gave
rise to the existing division in treatment of public and close corporations.
To resolve the tension created by equity crowdfunding, courts
should apply the contract-focused approach exemplified in Delaware’s
rejection of oppression doctrine. Requiring all parties to bargain and
contract for minority protections and other governance matters is a
superior solution to the unique issues presented by close-butcrowdfunded firms, as well as any issues that are common to ordinary
close corporations and crowdfunded close corporations. Using this
approach instead of the equitable reasoning underlying oppression
doctrine provides the flexibility needed to accommodate the
heterogeneous expectations emerging with crowdfunding and financial
technology more broadly. Crowds that invest in small ventures are still
big—thus, big crowds in small ventures should be analyzed more like the
big crowds that invest in big ventures.
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